Utah Law Review
Volume 2018 | Number 5

Article 3

12-2018

How to Sue a Robot
Roger Michalski

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr
Part of the Computer Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Michalski, Roger (2018) "How to Sue a Robot," Utah Law Review: Vol. 2018 : No. 5 , Article 3.
Available at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol2018/iss5/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Law Review by an
authorized editor of Utah Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu.

HOW TO SUE A ROBOT
Roger Michalski*
Abstract
We are entering the age of robots where autonomous robots will drive
our cars, milk cows, drill for oil, invest in stock, mine coal, build houses,
pick strawberries, and work as surgeons. Robots, in mimicking the work
of humans, will also mimic their legal liability. But how do you sue a
robot? The current answer is that you cannot. Robots are property. They
are not entities with a legal status that would make them amendable to sue
or be sued. If a robot causes harm, you have to sue its owner. Corporations
used to be like this for many procedural purposes. They were similarly
tethered to human owners. Over time, courts and legislators abandoned
the model of treating corporations solely as property and increasingly
treated them as an independent artificial person for litigation purposes.
Robots might also make a transition along those lines. If they do,
which legal model should we adopt for robots? Are they more like an
employee, a franchisee, a slave, a subsidiary, a child, an animal, a
subcontractor, an agent, or something else altogether? Given the inherent
path-dependence of procedural law, picking the right model will have
important consequences and will be difficult to reverse.
This Article lays the groundwork for this fundamental decision. It
explains the urgency and importance of this decision and presents three
analytical frameworks (ontological, deontological, and functional) for
how we can approach the question of robots in civil litigation. Often
unnoticed and unarticulated, these analytical frameworks structure
important doctrinal and normative positions. The Article then applies
these analytical frameworks to evaluate numerous concrete contestant
models for treating robots as litigation entities. The resulting taxonomy
exposes the weaknesses of analogizing robots to established models—none
fits, and all would have negative practical consequences. Instead of
utilizing an existing model, this Article argues that we must treat robots
as a new litigation category that borrows insights selectively and partially
from a range of the existing models. For example, we must craft a new in
robotam personal jurisdiction doctrine to supplement the old in personam
jurisdiction doctrine. Doing otherwise would expose procedure to
doctrinal incoherence, legislation to policy mayhem, and parties injured
by robots to unnecessary costs and insurmountable procedural hurdles.
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INTRODUCTION
Welcome to the age of robots. They drive our trucks,1 milk cows,2 drill for oil,3
1

See, e.g., Conner Dougherty, Self-Driving Trucks May Be Closer than They Appear,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/business/self-drivingtrucks.html [https://perma.cc/2U44-UWTP] (“Trucks will someday drive themselves out of
warehouses and cruise down freeways without the aid of humans or even a driver’s cab —
about that there seems little disagreement. The question is how soon that day gets here.”);
Daisuke Wakabayashi, Uber’s Self-Driving Trucks Hit the Highway, But Not Local Roads,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/technology/uber-selfdriving-trucks.html [https://perma.cc/67PC-K4VV] (“Uber said . . . its self-driving trucks
have been carrying cargo on highways in Arizona for commercial freight customers over the
past few months.”).
2
Jesse McKinley, With Farm Robotics, the Cows Decide when it’s Milking Time, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/nyregion/with-farm-roboticsthe-cows-decide-when-its-milking-time.html [https://perma.cc/ZW9T-HHHZ] (“Desperate
for reliable labor and buoyed by soaring prices, dairy operations across the state are charging
into a brave new world of udder care: robotic milkers, which feed and milk cow after cow
without the help of a single farmhand.”).
3
Clifford Krauss, Texas Oil Fields Rebound from Price Lull, But Jobs Are Left Behind,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/19/business/energy-
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invest in stock,4 mine coal,5 lay bricks,6 pick strawberries,7 and work as
longshoreman.8 A broad literature anticipates that robots will do more and more jobs
in the years to come.9 Robots, in mimicking the work of humans, will also mimic
environment/oil-jobs-technology.html?_r=0#story-continues-1 [https://perma.cc/QWG7TFRS] (“Pretty soon every rig will have one worker and a robot.”).
4
See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 687 (2013)
(“Modern finance is cyborg finance, an industry in which the key players are part human and
part machine.”); Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital
Markets, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1609 (2015) (“[T]oday’s marketplace has come to rely
heavily on automation and algorithms as an essential part of the trading process.”); Nils
Pratley, The Trillion-Dollar Questions over the Flash Crash and the Hound of Hounslow,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/apr/25/flash-crashhound-of-hounslow-trillion-dollar-question [https://perma.cc/YKU3-2UV4] (explaining
how autonomous machines that trade stocks in fractions of a second caused a “flash crash”);
see also Landon Thomas Jr., At BlackRock, Machines Are Rising over Managers to Pick
Stocks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/business/deal
book/blackrock-actively-managed-funds-computer-models.html [https://perma.cc/RPD7LNWS] (“‘The democratization of information has made it much harder for active
management,’ Mr. Fink said in an interview. ‘We have to change the ecosystem — that
means relying more on big data, artificial intelligence, factors and models within quant and
traditional investment strategies.’”).
5
Hiroko Tabuchi, Coal Mining Jobs Trump Would Bring Back No Longer Exist, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/business/coal-jobs-trumpappalachia.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/FRC2-RDGW] (“Caterpillar engineers are working
on the future of mining: mammoth haul trucks that drive themselves. The trucks have no
drivers, not even remote operators. Instead, the 850,000-pound vehicles rely on self-driving
technology, the latest in an increasingly autonomous line of trucks and drills that are
removing some of the human element from digging for coal. . . . Caterpillar’s autonomous
trucks are already being used at mines in Western Australia.”); see also Driving Productivity
in
the
Pilbara,
RIOTINTO,
http://www.riotinto.com/ourcommitment/spotlight18130_18328.aspx [https://perma.cc/24XS-CTT9] (last updated June 1, 2016).
6
Vice News, This Bricklaying Robot Can Build Walls Faster than Humans (HBO),
YOUTUBE
(July
26,
2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2-VR4IcDhX0
[https://perma.cc/4GBV-M2DY]; see also Quoctrung Bui & Roger Kisby, Bricklayers Think
They’re Safe from Robots. Decide for Yourself, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Mar. 6, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/07/upshot/bricklayers-think-theyre-safefrom-automation-robots.html [https://perma.cc/GSU2-EXTZ].
7
Ilan Brat, Robots Step into New Planting, Harvesting Roles, WALL STREET J. (Apr.
23, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/robots-step-into-new-planting-harvesting-roles1429781404 [https://perma.cc/Z7HF-HPCK].
8
See, e.g., Andrew O’Reilly, Automation of Port Terminals Threatens Thousands of
Lucrative Dock Worker Jobs, FOX NEWS U.S. (Mar. 27, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/us/
2017/03/27/automation-port-terminals-threatens-thousands-lucrative-dock-worker-jobs.
html [https://perma.cc/9R2Y-PL54] (“‘Those robots represent hundreds of (lost) jobs,’
Bobby Olvera Jr., president of International Longshore and Warehouse Union Local 13, told
the Press-Telegram. ‘It means hundreds of people that aren’t shopping. They aren’t paying
taxes and they aren’t buying homes.’”).
9
See RICHARD YONCK, HEART OF THE MACHINE: OUR FUTURE IN THE WORLD OF
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their legal liability. Autonomous cars and trucks will cause accidents.10 Robots will
engage in war crimes.11 Paparazzi drones will invade private spaces.12 Corporate
robots will breach contracts.13 Machine doctors will botch surgeries.14 Artificial
ARTIFICIAL EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE xi (2017) (exploring a near future where robots are
“designed to read, interpret, replicate, and potentially even influence human emotions.”);
JOHN MARKOFF, MACHINES OF LOVING GRACE: THE QUEST FOR COMMON GROUND
BETWEEN HUMANS AND ROBOTS 27 (2016); MARTIN FORD, THE RISE OF THE ROBOTS:
TECHNOLOGY AND THE THREAT OF A JOBLESS FUTURE 1 (2015); JERRY KAPLAN, HUMANS
NEED NOT APPLY: A GUIDE TO WEALTH AND WORK IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 10 (2015); ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE
AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 173
(2014).
10
See, e.g., Faiz Siddiqui & Michael Laris, Self-Driving Uber Strikes and Kills
Pedestrian, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/drgridlock/wp/2018/03/19/uber-halts-autonomous-vehicle-testing-after-a-pedestrian-is-struck
/?utm_term=.5294aeea968e [https://perma.cc/7T28-U6XY] (“Uber abruptly halted testing
of its autonomous vehicles across North America on Monday, after a 49-year old woman
was struck and killed by one of its cars while crossing a Tempe, Ariz. Street Sunday night.”);
Charles Rotter, Self-Driving Uber Running Red Light, YOUTUBE (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_CdJ4oae8f4 [https://perma.cc/Q28S-PS95]; Kenneth
S. Abraham & Robert L. Rabin, Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer Responsibility for
Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, 105 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019)
(manuscript at 19) (“The current driver-focused liability system will become a thing of the
past, by virtue of technological change itself—there will be very few occasions for drivers
to be negligent, because there will be very little “driving” by people. Auto manufacturers
will still be making vehicles, however, and their vehicles will be the cause of most
accidents.”).
11
See John Yoo, Embracing the Machines: Rationalist War and New Weapons
Technologies, 105 CAL. L. REV. 443, 449–57 (2017).
12
Andreas Ulrich et al., Snapping Tina’s Wedding: Paparazzi Turn to Drones, ABC
NEWS (Aug. 3, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/International/snapping-tinas-weddingpaparazzi-turn-drones/story?id=19842233 [https://perma.cc/SW7F-EQQ7]; see generally
Margot Kaminski et al., Averting Robot Eyes, 76 MD. L. REV. 983 (2017) (discussing privacy
concerns caused by “home robots”).
13
See generally Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts?, 9
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25 (1996) (analyzing a computer’s ability to enter into and enforce
contracts); see also Daisuke Wakabayashi, Meet the People Who Train the Robots (to Do
Their Own Jobs), N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/28/techn
ology/meet-the-people-who-train-the-robots-to-do-their-own-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/A
P23-66PQ] (quoting an entrepreneur who aims to innovate how contracts are written through
machine learning because “legal documents are well suited to machine learning because they
are highly structured and repetitive”).
14
See Jane R. Bambauer, Dr. Robot, 51 U.C.D. L. REV. 383, 384 (2017) (“[T]he most
important contributions from health and medical AI will substitute not devices, but
doctors.”); Meera Senthilingham, Would You Let a Robot Perform Your Surgery By It-self?,
CNN (May 12, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/12/health/robot-surgeon-boweloperation/ [https://perma.cc/MAY5-HA8U] (“The team showed for the first time that a
supervised autonomous robot could perform soft-tissue surgery, stitching together a pig’s
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intelligence will censor speech15 and engage in libel.16 And states will want to tax
and regulate robots.
But how can you sue a robot? The current answer is that you cannot. Robots
are property. They are not entities with a legal status that would make them
amendable to sue or be sued. If a robot causes harm you have to sue its owner.
Corporations used to be like that as well for many procedural purposes.17 They were
similarly once tethered to human actors. For example, federal diversity jurisdiction
did not assign corporations citizenship.18 Instead, corporations as property had the
citizenship of all the owners of the corporation.19 Over time, courts and legislators
bowel during open surgery — and doing so better than a human surgeon.”); Yohannes
Kassahun et al., Surgical Robotics Beyond Enhanced Dexterity Instrumentation: A Survey of
Machine Learning Techniques and their Role in Intelligent and Autonomous Surgical
Actions, 11 INT’L J. CARS 553, 553 (2016) (reviewing “the current role of machine learning
(ML) techniques in the context of surgery with a focus on surgical robotics”); Todd C.
Frankel, New Machine Could One Day Replace Anesthesiologists, WASH. POST (May 11,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/new-machine-could-one-dayreplace-anesthesiologists/2015/05/11/92e8a42c-f424-11e4-b2f3-af5479e6bbdd_story.html?
noredirect=on&utm_term=.d9601c4288f1 [https://perma.cc/2BEZ-PCBM].
15
Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Training Ad Placement Computers to Be Offended,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/technology/googletraining-ad-placement-computers-to-be-offended.html
[https://perma.cc/7PAA-JQCW]
(“Google engineers, product managers and policy wonks are trying to train computers to
grasp the nuances of what makes certain videos objectionable. Advertisers may tolerate use
of a racial epithet in a hip-hop video, for example, but may be horrified to see it used in a
video from a racist skinhead group.”).
16
See Ben Sisario, It’s Not Their Pop Idol, But a Bot Fans Cheer Anyway., N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/business/media/its-not-their-pop-idolbut-a-bot-fans-cheer-anyway.html [https://perma.cc/2GLE-A2K6].
17
See generally Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987) (explaining the law’s shifting views of
corporations); William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989) (discussing new theories of firm
identity and legality).
18
See, e.g., Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 86 (1809) (describing a
corporation as an “invisible, intangible, and artificial being” that is “certainly not a citizen”
for diversity jurisdiction purposes).
19
See, e.g., Commercial & R.R. Bank of Vicksburg v. Slocomb, Richards & Co., 39
U.S. 60, 63 (1840) (“The artificial being, a corporation aggregate, is not, as such, a citizen
of the United States; yet the Courts of the United States will look beyond the mere corporate
character, to the individuals of whom it is composed: and if they were citizens of a different
state from the party sued, they are competent to sue in the Courts of the United States; but
all the corporators must be citizens of a different state from the party sued. The same
principle applies to the individuals composing a corporation aggregate, when standing in the
attitude of defendants, which does when they are in that of plaintiffs.”); see also Hertz Corp.
v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 84 (2015) (describing early Supreme Court cases where “the Court
held that a corporation could invoke the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction based on a
pleading that the corporation’s shareholders were all citizens of a different State from the
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abandoned the model of treating corporations solely as property and increasingly
treated them as an independent artificial person for litigation purposes.20
Robots might also make a transition along those lines. If they do, which legal
model should we adopt for robots? Are they more like an employee, a franchisee, a
slave, a subsidiary, a child, an animal, a subcontractor, an agent, or something else
altogether? Given the inherent path-dependence of procedural law, picking the right
model will have important consequences and will be difficult to reverse.21 This
Article lays the groundwork for this fundamental decision. It aims to inform a broad
literature that spans across many legal fields with a unified framework for treating
robots as capable of being sued separately from their owners.22
This decision about how the law treats robots will only grow in importance as
robots proliferate across industries, take on more autonomous decision-making, and
become commonplace on streets, in kitchens, offices, and the skies. Predictably,
courts and legislators will soon have to establish standards in torts for the reasonable

defendants”).
20
See, e.g., Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497, 558
(1844) (“It is, that a corporation created by and doing business in a particular state, is to be
deemed to all intents and purposes as a person, although an artificial person, an inhabitant of
the same state, for the purposes of its incorporation, capable of being treated as a citizen of
that state, as much as a natural person. Like a citizen it makes contracts, and though in regard
to what it may do in some particulars it differs from a natural person, and in this especially,
the manner in which it can sue and be sued, it is substantially, within the meaning of the law,
a citizen of the state which created it, and where its business is done, for all the purposes of
suing and being sued.”); Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 106 (1898) (“The constant
tendency of judicial decisions in modern times has been in the direction of putting
corporations upon the same footing as natural persons in regard to the jurisdiction of suits by
or against them.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012) (“[A] corporation shall be deemed
to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the
State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business”).
21
Ryan Calo, Robots as Legal Metaphors, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 209, 210 (2016)
(“[J]udges hold an increasingly outdated mental model of what a robot is.”); see also
MARKOFF, supra note 9, at xix (2015) (“During the first half of this century, society will be
tasked with making hard decisions about the smart machines that have the potential to be our
servants, partners, or masters.”).
22
As such, this effort has many parallels with the work in the mid-1990s of legal
scholars to avoid the initial confusion surrounding the characterization and regulation of the
then emerging phenomena of the Internet. Their insights and shortcomings are deeply
enshrined in how law and society approach Internet-governance issues. See, e.g., Ryan Calo,
Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 514 (2015) [hereinafter Calo,
Lessons of Cyberlaw] (“In the mid-1990s, a movement arose among legal academics . . . .
Known by the name cyberlaw, its central tensions flow from the essential qualities of the
Internet, by which I mean the characteristics that distinguish the Internet from prior or
constituent technology such as computers or phones.”).
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robot,23 in evidence for robot testimony,24 in contract for a meeting of the minds and
circuits,25 in First Amendment jurisprudence for machine speech,26 in criminal law
for robotic mens rea, in taxation for how to count the work of robots for
unemployment insurance purposes,27 in antitrust for fully automated corporations,28
in policing for robo-police brutality,29 and in intellectual property for whether a robot
can create copyrightable material30 and patents.31 Much of our doctrinal framework
might be disrupted by the rise of the machines. But all of these substantive law
debates presume that we have an answer to the threshold procedural question of how
to sue a robot and enforce these substantive questions.
Two simple examples illustrate the importance of how we approach this
procedural question. Imagine a not-too-distant future in which autonomous trucks

23

See generally Karni Chagal-Feferkorn, The Reasonable Algorithm, U. ILL. J.L. TECH.
& POL’Y (forthcoming 2018) (discussing standards for determining tort liability for
algorithms and their authors).
24
Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 1972 (2017) [hereinafter
Roth, Machine Testimony] (“[The article] explains why machine sources can be ‘witnesses’
under the Sixth Amendment”); see also Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245,
1245 (2016) [hereinafter Roth, Trial by Machine] (exploring “the rise of ‘machines’ in
criminal adjudication”).
25
See generally Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Contracts, 43 J.
CORP. L. 1 (discussing implications of contracts that “writes its own terms or fills its own
gaps.”).
26
See generally Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2013) (discussing
how the First Amendment applies to algorithms); Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and
Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445 (2013) (analyzing whether algorithms are protected under
the First Amendment); Toni M. Massaro et al., Siri-ously 2.0: What Artificial Intelligence
Reveals about the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2481 (2017) (discussing the
extension of free speech rights to AI speakers).
27
See, e.g., Georgina Prodhan, Europe’s Robots to Become ‘Electronic Persons’ Under
Draft Plan, REUTERS (June 21, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-roboticslawmaking-idUSKCN0Z72AY [https://perma.cc/UH3P-PW5B] (noting the EU’s plan to
make robots ‘electronic persons’ for tax purposes under draft plan).
28
See, e.g., HANS MORAVEC, ROBOT: MERE MACHINE TO TRANSCENDENT MIND 132–
34, 139–41 (1999) (arguing that antitrust law must limit the growth and extent of fully
automated corporations run entirely by robots).
29
See Noel Sharkey et al., The Coming Robot Crime Wave, COMPUTER, Aug. 2010, at
116 (noting how police departments increasingly rely on robots for police functions).
30
See, e.g., Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially
Intelligent Author, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 21 (noting that robots, even if authors-infact, cannot hold copyrights because they have no legal personhood); see also About
Magenta, MAGENTA, https://magenta.tensorflow.org/ [https://perma.cc/37J8-QESP]
(“Magenta is a research project exploring the role of machine learning in the process of
creating art and music.”).
31
See ROBERT PLOTKIN, THE GENIE IN THE MACHINE: HOW COMPUTER-AUTOMATED
INVENTING IS REVOLUTIONIZING LAW AND BUSINESS 51–52 (2009) (noting that a company
used a “Creativity Machine” to generate patentable innovations).
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crisscross the nation, picking up and depositing cargo on their own.32 A foreign
company, call it McIntyre Inc., ships these autonomous trucks to the United States.33
McIntyre hopes to maximize profit as much as it can, wherever it can. It excludes
no region or State from where the autonomous truck may operate, but, of course, it
seeks to avoid any legal liability in the United States. One of McIntyre’s trucks
drives through New Jersey where it is involved in a crash with Nicastro that severs
four fingers from his right hand. Can Nicastro sue McIntyre in New Jersey, or, really,
anywhere in the United States?
If a human had driven the truck, the answer would be fairly straightforward.
The truck driver is capable of manifesting purposeful availment sufficient to satisfy
the minimum contacts test.34 She has evinced “implied consent” to personal
jurisdiction over her in New Jersey courts.35 But a robot, as currently conceptualized,
is just property. Property cannot have intent (only owners of property can).36 Without
intent, there can be no purposeful availment, no implied consent, and therefore, no
personal jurisdiction over McIntyre in New Jersey.37 This result is striking, in part,
because Nicastro might not have been able to tell whether the truck that injured him
was driven by a human or an autonomously acting machine. And yet that difference
determines whether he has access to domestic courts or must pursue his claim in a

32

See, e.g., Tiffany Hsu, Self-Driving Trucks, Delivery Vans at Vanguard of
Autonomous Vehicle Revolution, TRUCKS.COM (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.trucks.com/
2017/04/13/self-driving-trucks-autonomous-vehicle-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/Q6DDBFNQ] (“[L]ong-haul trucks, delivery vans, fleet units and other business-based vehicles
will be at the front lines as self-driving vehicles are introduced onto city streets.”).
33
This example is loosely based on J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro and borrows
extensively from Justice Ginsburg’s dissent. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564
U.S. 873, 893–910 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
34
See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“[I]t is essential in each case
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.”) (emphasis added).
35
Compare J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 564 U.S. at 887 (2011) (majority opinion) (“At no
time did petitioner engage in any activities in New Jersey that reveal an intent to invoke or
benefit from the protection of its laws.” (emphasis added)) with id. at 900 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]n International Shoe itself, and decisions thereafter, the Court has made plain
that legal fictions, notably ‘presence’ and ‘implied consent,’ should be discarded, for they
conceal the actual bases on which jurisdiction rests.”).
36
See Calo, Lessons of Cyberlaw, supra note 22, at 539 (“Little is gained, and much is
arguably lost, by pretending contemporary robots exhibit anything like intent.”).
37
Intent is, of course, a vital concept in many other areas of law as well (e.g., transferred
intent in tort).
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foreign, expensive, and perhaps unsympathetic forum.38 If domestic courts are not
available, he likely will not sue at all—anywhere.
Similarly, imagine that New Jersey has a statute that regulates truck deliveries
and requires contributions to state programs (e.g., a worker’s unemployment fund
or highway infrastructure fund).39 Even though McIntyre’s autonomous trucks
contribute to a significant volume of interstate commercial activity that touches on
New Jersey, McIntyre does not contribute to the state programs as required by the
state statute. Can the State of New Jersey acquire personal jurisdiction over McIntyre
and enforce its statutes? The answer to this question determines the viability of its
substantive regulatory and taxation regimes.40 Perhaps even more striking, the
answer to this question does not just affect activity within courts, but it could also
shape whether McIntyre employs humans in New Jersey or opts for machines. How
we conceptualize robots for jurisdictional purposes shapes liability, regulation and
taxation regimes, and primary conduct.
It is not surprising that in personam jurisdiction as here described does not mesh
easily with robots. They are not persons and courts crafted in personam jurisdiction
with human persons in mind (with uneasy extensions to corporations). Personal
jurisdiction is not the only area of procedure where robots do not fit snugly within
the current doctrinal framework. Other areas of procedure similarly assume human
or human-like entities. For example, diversity jurisdiction is based on citizenship.41
Citizenship is a concept easily applied to persons and to corporations by statute,42
but currently not to robots (thus affecting whether Nicastro in the example above
has access to federal courts and whether a state court case is removable43). Similarly,
there is no clear way to serve a summons and complaint on a robot, use tag
jurisdiction on a robot, to implead robots, to punish robots for spoliation, to claimpreclude robots,44 garnish wages from a robot, or to conceive of punitive damages
38
Relatedly, humans and even corporations can be “at home” in a state and thus subject
to general jurisdiction. But robots, as currently conceived, cannot be at home anywhere
because property does not have a home, only a location. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011); see also BNSF R.R. Co. v. Tyrrell,
137 S. Ct. 1549, 1561 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It
is individual plaintiffs, harmed by the actions of a farflung foreign corporation, who will bear
the brunt of the majority’s approach and be forced to sue in distant jurisdictions with which
they have no contacts or connection.”).
39
This example is loosely based on Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
40
As robots do more and more work previously performed by humans, the question of
how to tax robots will have profound consequences on the tax-base of many jurisdictions
and the possibility of a wealthy, stable, post-work world.
41
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
42
Id. § 1332(c)(1) (“[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State and
foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has
its principal place of business”).
43
See, e.g., id. § 1441 (in-state defendant exception).
44
Does litigation against a robot preclude its owner, does litigation against a robot’s
owner create a preclusion effect against the robot? See generally Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S.
880, 892–93 (2008) (noting the “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his
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against robots.45 Well-established conflict of laws doctrines utilize residency and
intent to establish a domicile as cornerstones of their practical and normative
appeal.46 But robots as property cannot have intent to establish a domicile in ways
humans can.47 All of these doctrines and statutes, among many more, are designed
with human actors in mind, not autonomous robots.48
This Article’s main purpose is to take a foundational and broad view at how
robots could be integrated into our human-centric litigation model. Part I makes clear
the urgency of filling this procedural gap by descriptively situating the scale of
autonomous robot-human interactions. Doing so lays the groundwork for the rest of
the Article by answering “why now?” The answer has much to do with truckers.
Currently, trucking provides 2 million well-paid blue-collar jobs to people around
the country.49 What if autonomous robots supplant those jobs and jobs in many other
sectors of the economy?50 Arguably, that is a far greater threat than outsourcing or

own day in court”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
45
See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003)
(tying the availability and extent of punitive damages, in part, to whether “the harm was the
result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident”).
46
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 15(2) (1934) (“To acquire a
domicil of choice, a person must establish a dwelling-place with the intention of making it
his home.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1)–(2) (1971) (“The
rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local
law of that state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties” taking into account a variety of factors including “the domicil,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties” (emphasis
added)).
47
See generally Jack L. Goldsmith III, Note, Interest Analysis Applied to Corporations:
The Unprincipled Use of a Choice of Law Method, 98 YALE L.J. 597 (1989) (noting the
difficulties associated with attributing a “domicile” to corporations).
48
On the federal level, capacity to sue is generally tied in this context to state rules that
currently do not take robots into account. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)(3) (“Capacity to sue or
be sued is determined as follows: . . . for all other parties, by the law of the state where the
court is located.”).
49
TABLE 2.7 EMPLOYMENT AND OUTPUT BY INDUSTRY, 2006, 2016, AND PROJECTED
2026,
BUREAU OF LAB. STATS.,
https://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_table_207.htm
[https://perma.cc/8M6Q-JAZM]. Many more earn a living by driving commercially nontruck vehicles. Id.
50
Robots do not threaten all sectors of the economy equally. For example, it is more
difficult to replace a lawyer with a robot than a fast-food worker. For now. See generally
Steve Lohr, A.I. Is Doing Legal Work. But It Won’t Replace Lawyers, Yet, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/19/technology/lawyers-artificial-intelligence
.html [https://perma.cc/K8DC-Z9J4] (“[L]ike it or not, a robot is not about to replace your
lawyer”); Cf. Steve Lohr, A.I. Will Transform the Economy. But How Much, and How Soon?,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/technology/ai-willtransform-the-economy-but-how-much-and-how-soon.html
[https://perma.cc/YXK2FDT8] (“[T]he number of Americans who will have to find new occupations by 2030 ranges
from 16 million to 54 million—depending on the pace of technology adoption.”).
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foreign competition.51 For the first time it is imaginable that robots could soon drive
many of these trucks cheaper and safer without the need for rest, sleep, or bathroom
breaks.52 Just as the invention of tractors has made farming more efficient,
autonomous trucks could make trucking more efficient.53 However, the potential for
social upheaval is massive. If robots are not properly regulated, taxed, and held
legally accountable for mistakes, it will only take one highway accident to bring out
the villagers with pitchforks to burn down every robot in sight.54
The astonishing expansion of what robots can do, where we use them, and the
speed with which they are infiltrating society is rendering many legal doctrines
obsolete. We would do well to deliberate carefully about legal responses to the age
of robots and adjust our litigation system now in recognition of changes that have
already taken place and anticipating the further rise of machines. If we do not, civil
procedure will be obsolete with regard to a huge engine of social and economic
transformation.
Part II outlines different analytical frameworks for how we can approach the
question of robots in civil litigation. It specifies three conceptual approaches that
help to frame our thinking about the role of non-humans in litigation settings. Often
unnoticed and unarticulated, these analytical frameworks structure important
doctrinal and normative thinking. This section makes them explicit and evaluates
51

See, e.g., BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 9, at 185 (“[O]ffshoring is often
only a way station on the road to automation.”); see also Friedhelm Greis, Trump-Regierung
sorgt sich um Jobs für Trucker [Trump Government Worries About Jobs for Truckers],
GOLEM.DE (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.golem.de/news/autonome-lkw-trump-regierungsorgt-sich-um-jobs-fuer-trucker-1703-126472.html [https://perma.cc/97L4-PLFW].
52
See generally COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLE FACTS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (2010),
https://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/CarrierResearchResults/PDFs/CMVFacts/CMVFacts-Dec201002082011.pdf [https://perma.cc/76TA-4RKG ] (reporting that trucks are involved in almost
300,000 accidents a year, 3000 of which result in fatalities). See also Dougherty, supra note
1 (“Autonomous technology will help trucking companies reduce labor costs in the long run,
first by extending the number of hours trucks are in operation, and later, by reducing the
number of drivers. The industry spends billions of dollars a year on accidents that are largely
caused by human error, and billions more on insurance premiums that should go down if and
when self-driving technology is proven to be safer than human drivers.”).
53
See generally Wassily Leontief, National Perspective: The Definition of Problems
and Opportunities, in THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON E MPLOYMENT AND
UNEMPLOYMENT 3, 3–4 (1983) (“[T]he role of humans as the most important factor of
production is bound to diminish—in the same way that the role of horses in agricultural
production was first diminished and then eliminated by the introduction of tractors.”).
54
See generally Calo, Lessons of Cyberlaw, supra note 22, at 517 (“[T]he widespread
distribution of robotics in society will, like the Internet, create deep social, cultural,
economic, and of course legal tensions long before the advent of science fiction.”); Kevin
Roose, His 2020 Campaign Message: The Robots Are Coming, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/10/technology/his-2020-campaign-message-the-robotsare-coming.html [https://perma.cc/7XD8-NVCK] (“We have five to 10 years before truckers
lose their jobs . . . and all hell breaks loose.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

1032

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

their strengths. The first approach is ontological, answering questions about the
status of robots based on their essential nature. The second approach is
deontological, grounding litigation rights in moral obligations we have or do not
have toward robots. The last is functional, asking about the practical effects in
litigation of treating robots as separate from their owners. A theory of robot litigation
could also mix and match elements of all three approaches. Whether unconscious or
deliberate, these three analytical frameworks animate much of our thinking about
different ways of treating non-humans in the law.
Part III applies these analytical frameworks to evaluate numerous concrete
contestant models for treating robots as litigation entities. The possibilities are
broad, ranging from treating robots for litigation purposes as property, corporations,
employees, slaves, franchisees, subsidiaries, children, animals, agents, or
subcontractors. This taxonomy exposes the weaknesses of analogizing robots to
established models. None fits, and all would have negative practical consequences.
Part III concludes by exposing the great Faustian bargain inherent in many of the
existing litigation models. Analogizing robots to an existing model would make
enforcement of laws easier but would also lower how much can be recovered in
enforcement.
To solve this dilemma, Part IV argues that we must treat robots as a new
litigation category that borrows insights selectively and partially from a range of the
existing models. For example, we must craft a new in robotam jurisdiction doctrine
to supplement the old in personam jurisdiction doctrine. We must develop separate
standards for how a robot establishes a domicile for choice-of-law purposes, how
liability is shared between robot and owner, how wages are garnished from a robot,
and the many other procedural rules that hinge on an understanding of intent,
personhood, and independent agency. Only by unshackling robots from existing
litigation frameworks can we escape the old Faustian bargain.
The main arguments against this proposal are that it will be complicated and
stifle the development of new and exciting robot technology. However, we do not
want development of just any robot technology. We want responsible robot
technology that is mindful of the legal harm robots can cause. Only by unbundling
litigation doctrines and tailoring them to the practical realities of robots as litigation
entities can we provide courts with the tools and flexibility to take account of rapidly
developing technology and changing social views of how robots integrate into our
society.

2018]

HOW TO SUE A ROBOT

1033

Part IV concludes by looking into the crystal ball and projecting future strengths
and weaknesses of treating autonomous robots as something other than property for
litigation purposes. It argues that a procedural status as an artificial person can lay
the groundwork for a substantive status as a kind of person entitled to basic and
constitutional rights. Slowly, unintentionally, clandestinely, robots could build on
procedural foundations to become substantive rights-bearers (just as corporations
did before them).55 This possibility gives great urgency to procedural discussions
about the status of robots in our legal system.
I. THE ROBOTS ARE COMING
Robots in various forms have been with us for a long time, mostly on factory
floors. However, a tidal wave of new robots is sweeping into public spaces. Robots
are becoming pervasive and integrated into the fabric of daily life. They drive us
around, assist us at work, take care of our elders and children,56 and increasingly
build, grow, and transport the things we eat and consume.57 This section explains
how robots are doing more, more autonomously, and why they are no longer
confined to factory floors but exist out there in our shared world. Understanding how
and why this is happening is the foundation for recognizing the ways in which robots
might disrupt existing legal regimes (both for good and for bad). This section will
conclude by highlighting how this potential for disruption is being recognized in
many substantive areas of law but how procedure has not similarly responded.
A. Moving Beyond Factories
I will discuss issues surrounding the precise definition of robots below.58 For
now I will use as a working definition of robots “a mechanical object that exhibits
near, at, or beyond human autonomous decision-making capacity.” This is a crude
definition. Its sole purpose is to capture the thought that if I cannot tell whether a
human or a machine is driving the truck next to me on the highway, then this might
require us to rethink litigation practices when the truck collides with my car.

55
See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
(holding that corporations are protected by the First Amendment).
56
See, e.g., Rachel Botsman, Co-Parenting with Alexa, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION (Oct. 7,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/07/opinion/sunday/children-alexa-echo-robots.
html [https://perma.cc/Q5HU-BBGG] (“The next generation will grow up in an age where
it’s normal to be surrounded by autonomous agents, with or without cute names. The Alexas
of the world will make a raft of decisions for my kids . . . .”).
57
See also Conrad De Aenlle, A.I. Has Arrived in Investing. Humans Are Still
Dominating., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/12/business/
ai-investing-humans-dominating.html [https://perma.cc/9JRP-NH3R] (“Machines are
starting to take the place of the people who flip burgers, drive across town and, lately, manage
stock portfolios.”).
58
See infra Section II.A & IV.B.
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The reason why robots of this variety have suddenly become an issue for civil
procedure is two-fold: robots can do more than ever, and they are doing it out there
in the world. Planes, for example, can largely do without pilots these days.59
Autonomously driving cars can ferry blind passengers.60 As these examples
illustrate, these robots are no longer confined to factory floors where previous
generations of robots toiled. Instead, they control machinery in spaces they share
with all of us.
This shift is significant because the environments of robots in the past were
rigidly controlled, and human proximity to them limited.61 Controlling the liability
surrounding such bolted-down robots was achieved in significant part by fencing
them off.62 However, barriers and emergency-off buttons are not feasible out there
on a highway. Similarly, since access to factory robots could be controlled, factory
owners could limit proximity to these robots to workers covered by workers’
compensation regimes, thereby managing their own liability.63 Finally, factory
robots do not create jurisdictional and choice-of-law issues like autonomous vehicles
since they stay put and do not cross state lines.

59

See generally John Markoff, Planes Without Pilots, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/07/science/planes-without-pilots.html?mcubz=1
[https://perma.cc/6XRX-2W6N] (“Advances in sensor technology, computing and artificial
intelligence are making human pilots less necessary than ever in the cockpit. Already,
government agencies are experimenting with replacing the co-pilot, perhaps even both pilots
on cargo planes, with robots or remote operators. . . . In a recent survey of airline pilots, those
operating Boeing 777s reported that they spent just seven minutes manually piloting their
planes in a typical flight. Pilots operating Airbus planes spent half that time.”).
60
Google, Self-Driving Car Test: Steve Mahan, YOUTUBE (Mar. 28, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cdgQpa1pUUE [https://perma.cc/8BT4-6ZA2].
61
See, e.g., KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 6 (“To date, automation has mostly meant specialpurpose machines relegated to performing repetitive, single tasks on factory floors, where
the environment is designed around them. In contrast, these new systems will be out and
about, tending fields, painting houses, cleaning sidewalks, washing and folding laundry.”).
62
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., STD
01-12-002, GUIDELINES FOR ROBOTICS SAFETY (1987) (emphasizing the value of placing
around robots an “Interlocked Barrier Guard” and “Fixed Barrier Guard” as well as
“Awareness Barrier Device” and “Presence Sensing Devices”).
63
See generally F. Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing Liability,
Regulation, and Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1830–31 (2014) (“Because so many
robots are used in factories and other employment settings, injuries to workers by robotic
machines have been the impetus for employees to bring numerous claims. Tort suits against
employers are complicated by the fact that employees injured on the job are usually covered
by workers’ compensation. In most states, workers who are injured while working for their
employer cannot sue the employer in tort; workers’ compensation is their exclusive remedy.
In effect, the employer is immune from most tort suits brought by an employee.” (citations
omitted)).
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B. More Autonomously
Understanding how robots have left the factory floor is important to assess how
civil procedure should treat robots. Modern robots are acting more and more
autonomously than robots of the past because of the confluence of cheap sensors,
exponential growth in abundant computation power, and breakthroughs in artificial
intelligence.64 I will focus here on the artificial intelligence element because of the
potentially serious implications for procedure.
Until very recently, much programming was algorithmic in nature, leading a
program through a series of instructions, step-by-step, to a conclusion. Typically,
and by design, these instructions marched from one set of input to the same set of
output. This led to the widespread thought in popular culture that computers can
only do what they are programmed to do. More recently, two new modes of
programming have shown their practical usefulness: machine learning and genetic
programming. Both are different from traditional algorithmic programing and might
disrupt numerous legal frameworks.
Machine learning typically relies on programming that mimics neural
networks.65 In this approach, computation is based on multiple layers of artificial
neurons. Connections between these neurons can be strengthened or weakened over
time. A program is “trained” on a set of known inputs. For example, the program is
shown a series of pictures, some containing a chair and some containing a dog.66
These pre-coded examples help to train the network by adjusting the weights
between artificial neurons. The advent of big data has contributed to neural
networking programming because it has greatly expanded (in many areas) the stock
of pre-coded examples that can be used to train an artificial neural network. One
famous example is Google Translate. It went from being barely passable to
surprisingly useful when the team switched to machine learning paired with a deep
64

See generally Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks,
Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 354 (2016)
(“Artificial intelligence (“AI”) permeates our lives in numerous subtle and not-so-subtle
ways, performing tasks that, until quite recently, could only be performed by a human with
specialized knowledge, expensive training, or a government-issued license.”); see also
Gideon Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awakening, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/99Z3-8XPN].
65
As such, I will treat “machine learning” here as a family of computational
approaches. The discussion reduces a massive amount of complexity and variation for the
sake of brevity and focus.
66
Cade Metz, A New Way for Machines to See, Taking Shape in Toronto, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/28/technology/artificial-intelligenceresearch-toronto.html?hpw&rref=technology&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=
well-region&region=bottom-well&WT.nav=bottom-well [https://perma.cc/EKK2-WAWH]
(“Loosely modeled on the web of neurons in the human brain, neural networks are algorithms
that can learn discrete tasks by identifying patterns in large amounts of data. By analyzing
thousands of car photos, for instance, a neural network can learn to recognize a car.”).
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stock of pre-coded examples from government translation projects.67 Many robots
that accomplish increasingly more autonomous tasks out there in the world rely on
such (or similar) machine learning. This is relevant for litigation purposes for what
it is and for what it is not.
While machine learning is built on the insights of human neural networks, it
does not replicate the human brain.68 As the saying goes, airplanes were inspired by
birds, but they do not flap their wings. Similarly, artificial intelligence built on
artificial neural networks is inspired by human brains but does not re-create human
brains in a computational environment. This means, among many other things, that
we must be very cautious about the use of terms like “artificial intelligence,” “robot
brain,” “thoughts,” “intention,” and the like. An autonomously driving car on the
highway might behave a lot like a car driven by a human, but the computational
thought processes that led to the behavior are very different. Robots do stuff (e.g.,
turn on the blinker and switch lanes). But they do not have intentions, desires,
passions, or consciousness (all important categories in many areas of law) in the
same way humans do.69
Equally startling, artificial neural networks cannot tell us how they do things or
how they arrived at a conclusion.70 They are inscrutable.71 Even if they get it right
every time (e.g., sorting pictures of dogs and chairs perfectly), we cannot peer into
their workings to understand how they accomplish a task.72 To do so would require
67

See, e.g., Lewis-Kraus, supra note 64 (“The original Rosetta Stone of statistical
machine translation was millions of pages of the complete bilingual records of the Canadian
Parliament.”).
68
See, e.g., Cade Metz, Chips Off the Old Block: Computers Are Taking Design Cues
from Human Brains, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/16/
technology/chips-off-the-old-block-computers-are-taking-design-cues-from-human-brains.
html [https://perma.cc/VZ5P-E6WL] (“[S]ome of the world’s largest tech companies . . . are
rethinking the very nature of computers and are building machines that look more like the
human brain . . . .”).
69
See generally KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 4 (“You might reasonably describe [robots]
as exhibiting superhuman intelligence, but that’s misleading—at least for the foreseeable
future—because these machines aren’t conscious, self-reflective, and don’t exhibit any hint
of independent aspirations or personal desires.”).
70
See, e.g., Tad Friend, Sam Altman’s Manifest Destiny, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/10/10/sam-altmans-manifest-destiny [https://
perma.cc/298Y-SJRW] (“Y Combinator has even begun using an A.I. bot . . . to help it sift
admission applications: the bot’s neural net trains itself by assessing previous applications
and those companies’ outcomes. ‘What’s it looking for?’ I asked Altman. ‘I have no idea,’
he replied. ‘That’s the unsettling thing about neural networks—you have no idea what
they’re doing, and they can’t tell you.’”).
71
Cade Metz, Competing with the Giants in Race to Build Self-Driving Cars, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/technology/self-driving-carsaurora.html [https://perma.cc/ZW38-GVNJ] (“There is no means of determining exactly
why a machine reaches a particular decision.”).
72
KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 4 (“They are incredibly good at specific tasks, but we don’t
fully understand how they do what they do.”).
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us to simulate a complex artificial neural network in our own head.73 This is a task
that is simply beyond the computational capacity of human brains.
The second computation approach worth mentioning here is genetic and
evolutionary programing.74 The basic idea with these approaches is to construct a
range of programs that perform tasks, compete against each other, and change (often
randomly) over time.75 Variations of the program that complete tasks well survive
and thrive. They create more copies of themselves with slight modifications for the
next iteration. Variations of the program that do not complete tasks well wither and
eventually die. In this semi-structured manner programs can emerge that were not
contemplated by any human. A human might have contemplated the process of
genetic programing, but not the particular program that emerged as a result of the
process.
The rise of genetic programming and machine learning (sometimes also
combined) is relevant to the discussion at hand because it can be used to design
robots that, in some sense, evolve beyond the intent of their creators. To the extent
they do, this makes it more difficult to ascribe the intent of the robot to the intent of
the owner of the robot. More recently, prominent companies have also started to
invest heavily in “artificially intelligent machines that can build other artificially
intelligent machines.”76 This removes humans one layer farther away from the
actions and decisions of machines.77 If successful, this would make it more difficult
still to trace human intent to machine behavior.78
Together, cheap sensors, amble computational power, and artificial intelligence
innovations like machine learning and genetic programing have reshaped what
robots can do, where they can do it, and how little supervision they need.

73

Id. at 30 (“In most cases, it’s impossible for the creators of machine learning
programs to peer into their intricate evolving structure to understand or explain what they
know or how they solve a problem, any more than I can look into your brain to understand
what you are thinking about.”).
74
Again, I will use the term “genetic programming” as a crude shorthand for a family
of approaches. See generally J.R. KOZA, GENETIC PROGRAMMING: ON THE PROGRAMMING
OF COMPUTERS BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION, 1 (1992) (exploring whether “computers
can solve problems without being explicitly programmed,” or, in other words, whether
computers can “be made to do what is needed to be done without being told explicitly how
to do it”).
75
Id.
76
Cade Metz, Building A.I. that Can Build A.I., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/05/technology/machine-learning-artificial-intelligenceai.html [https://perma.cc/PWC8-M4YF].
77
Machines could, of course, also design machines that design machines, thus adding
more and more layers of design between humans and outcomes.
78
Metz, supra note 71(noting that modern robots “operate in ways that their human
designers cannot necessarily anticipate or understand.”).
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C. New Social, Political, and Economic Issues
These developments have led to significant engagement with issues
surrounding robots as exemplified by a steady outpouring of TV shows, movies, and
stories about robots killing humans and or surpassing us in intelligence and
humanity.79
While entertaining, the more pressing and realistic concerns raised by
autonomous robots are found elsewhere. Robots are not competing with us for
political or military supremacy, but they have the potential to radically alter who
works, who holds wealth, and who is at the mercy of malfunctioning robots.80
A fierce debate is currently taking place in numerous fields whether robots are
simply replacing some kinds of work (e.g., truck driving) with other kind of work
(e.g., engineering autonomous trucks) or whether autonomous robots will make
humans obsolete altogether in many current fields of employment.81 Either way, the
companies and people who control and own the robots will reap enormous economic
benefits. Meanwhile, people whose jobs will be performed by robots will suffer
economically.82
This suggests a new era of great opportunities and dangers. Likely, the overall
economic pie will grow,83 but the distribution of the pie will also grow ever more
79

The contested status of quasi-human machines is an old one that runs at least to the
Romantic literature movement of the late 18th and early 19th century. See, e.g., E.T.A.
HOFFMAN, The Sandman, in TALES OF HOFFMAN (Penguin Classics, reprt. ed. 1982) (1816).
More recent iterations often trace their themes and tropes to Asimov.
80
See, e.g., KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 201 (“The storied robot Armageddon of book and
film won’t actually unfold as a military conflict. Machines will not revolt and take up arms
to challenge our dominance. Instead, it will be a slow and insidious takeover of our economy,
barely perceptible as we willingly cede control to seemingly beneficial synthetic intellects.”).
81
See generally MARKOFF, supra note 9, at 27 (“[Many technologists believe that] we
are on the brink of the creation of an entire economy that runs largely without human
intervention.”); Illah Reza Nourbakhsh, The Coming Robot Dystopia, FOREIGN AFF., Jul.–
Aug. 2015, at 23, 27 (“No fundamental barrier exists to stop the untoward march of robots
into the labor market: almost every job, blue collar and white collar, will be at risk in an age
of exponential progress in computing and robotics.”); KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 3 (“Whether
the website that finds you a date or the robot that cuts your grass will do it the same way you
do doesn’t matter. It will get the job done more quickly, accurately, and at a lower cost than
you possibly can.”). But cf. No, Robots Aren’t Killing the American Dream, N.Y. TIMES:
OPINION (Feb. 20, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/opinion/no-robots-arentkilling-the-american-dream.html [https://perma.cc/LD7Q-TLD3] (arguing that robots are
not hurting human employment as much as commonly believed).
82
They might also suffer in other ways. Given the centrality of work to the identity of
many people, seeing a robot perform your job (and perhaps do it better than you ever did)
could entail its own kind of trauma.
83
See, e.g., BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 9, at 9–10 (“[T]he transformations
brought about by digital technology will be profoundly beneficial ones. We’re heading into
an era that won’t just be different; it will be better, because we’ll be able to increase both the
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uneven.84 According to some estimates, roughly half of all U.S. blue-collar and
white-collar jobs are at a high risk of significant automation.85 Even a partial
realization of this prophecy could have dramatic economic, social, and political
consequences. For example, recent political debates have focused on the role of
outsourcing U.S. jobs to factories abroad.86 However, autonomous robots might be
a bigger danger to U.S. manufacturing jobs than foreign competition.87
Combined with concentrated wealth, the visible replacement of human labor
with robots might already contribute to voting preferences88 and could have
profound political consequences in the long run.89 For example, imagine if Uber
succeeds and replaces its many human drivers with robots. What kind of political
response will these replaced humans demand? What kind of social turmoil will this

variety and the volume of our consumption.”).
84
See id. at 133 (noting that “exponential, digital, and combinatorial” technological
change is the “primary driver of growing inequality”).
85
See Carl Benedikt Frey & Michale Osborne, The Future of Employment: How
Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?, OXFORD MARTIN SCH. (Sept.
2013),http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Employmen
t.pdf) [https://perma.cc/JGT2-9VSD]; See also KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 10 (“A broad cross
section of today’s blue-collar and white-collar jobs will soon come under threat from forged
laborers and synthetic intellects respectively. An astonishing range of productive activities,
both physical and mental, will become vulnerable to replacement.”).
86
Interestingly, there is some early evidence that factories are returning to the US to be
closer to customers but with the significant caveat that the new re-shored factories are mostly
run by robots and few jobs compared to their old versions.
87
Meanwhile, the foreign competition is turning increasingly away from human labor
in favor of robots as well. See, e.g., Martin Ford, China’s Troubling Robot Revolution, N.Y.
TIMES: OPINION (June 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/11/opinion/chinastroubling-robot-revolution.html?mcubz=1) [https://perma.cc/YF3J-Q7W7] (“Foxconn,
which makes consumer electronics for Apple and other companies, plans to automate about
70 percent of factory work . . . .”). Interestingly, this could contribute to a “reshoring” trend.
See generally FORD, supra note 9, at 9 (noting a “reshoring” trend where work that was
previously outsourced to other nations is brought back because of new technologies that,
however, rely on fewer workers).
88
See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, Robots Can’t Vote, But They Helped Elect Trump, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/11/opinion/trump-robotselectoral-college.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&
module=opinion-c-col-left-region&region=opinion-c-col-left-region&WT.nav=opinion-ccol-left-region [https://perma.cc/L44B-LJZR] (“[T]he workers who experience the highest
costs from industrial automation fit the crucial Trump voter demographic . . . .”).
89
See, e.g., BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 9, at 170–73 (highlighting the
connection between technological change, decreased social mobility, and political
instability).
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instigate?90 What will extreme concentrations of wealth do to democratic norms?91
And more pressing still, how will those hurt by malfunctioning robots receive relief?
D. Responses from Substantive Law
Technology leaders have recognized the massive potential inherent in artificial
intelligence and the infiltration of robots throughout society, with many of them
calling for significant regulation.92 Congress93 and other legislators94 are considering
bills to regulate artificial intelligence.
Legal scholars, similarly, have recognized that the widespread infiltration of
robots into society could disrupt much of our substantive doctrinal frameworks. For
example, robots are more intimately involved in creating and vetting speech than
ever before. This has led to a lively debate in First Amendment jurisprudence about
the status of “machine speech.”95 Scholarship on the use of machine learning

90

See KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 3 (“[W]e may be in for an extended period of social
turmoil.”).
91
See generally id. at 11 (“The wealthy [who own and control the robots] will need
few, if any, people to work for them at all.”).
92
See, e.g., Eric Mack, Bill Gates Says You Should Worry About Artificial Intelligence,
FORBES (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericmack/2015/01/28/bill-gates-alsoworries-artificial-intelligence-is-a-threat/ [https://perma.cc/789W-UZB5] (quoting Bill
Gates as writing that “I am in the camp that is concerned . . . . First the machines will do a
lot of jobs for us and not be super intelligent. That should be positive if we manage it
well . . . . A few decades after that though the intelligence is strong enough to be a
concern.”); Peter Holley, Apple Co-Founder on Artificial Intelligence: “The Future Is Scary
and Very Bad for People,” WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Mar. 24, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2015/03/24/apple-co-founder-onartificial-intelligence-the-future-is-scary-and-very-bad-for-people/ [https://perma.cc/2MCX
-K2ZP] (quoting Steve Wozniak as saying that “[i]f we build these devices to take care of
everything for us, eventually they’ll think faster than us and they’ll get rid of the slow humans
to run companies more efficiently.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Aileen Graef, Elon
Musk: We Are ‘Summoning a Demon’ with Artificial Intelligence, UPI (Oct. 27, 2014),
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/2014/10/27/Elon-Musk-We-are-summoning-a-demon
-with-artificial-intelligence/4191414407652/ [https://perma.cc/6AYU-BDZ7] (“I think we
should be very careful about artificial intelligence. If I had to guess at what our biggest
existential threat is, it’s probably that. . . . I’m increasingly inclined to think there should be
some regulatory oversight, maybe at the national and international level, just to make sure
that we don’t do something very foolish.”).
93
See, e.g., Fundamentally Understanding the Usability and Realistic Evolution of
Artificial Intelligence Act of 2017, S. 2217, 115th Cong. (2017),
https://www.cantwell.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/The%20FUTURE%20of%20AI%20Act%
20Introduction%20Text.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6YX-WGGW].
94
See, e.g., Automated Decision Systems Used by Agencies, 2017 N.Y.C. Council, Int.
No. 1696-A, (N.Y. 2017), legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3137815&
GUID=437A6A6D-62E1-47E2-9C42-461253F9C6D0 [https://perma.cc/SCB3-H4K2].
95
See e.g., Wu, supra note 26; Benjamin, supra note 26; Massaro et al., supra note 26.

2018]

HOW TO SUE A ROBOT

1041

algorithms in the financial services industries is examining related issues.96
Similarly, much of tort law is predicated on a stable notion of intent and negligence.
However, both concepts are inherently human centric and a poor fit for how robots
operate. For example, how does the notion of “transferred intent” apply to a robot
that can strike and harm people but cannot form intent? Predictably, this mismatch
between doctrine and social reality will call for modifications and clarifications of
substantive tort rules as robots do more things that, if done by a human, might
constitute an intentional tort or a negligent act.97 Copyright98 and patent law,99
contracts,100 evidence,101 taxation,102 administrative law,103 criminal law, police
regulation,104 and antitrust law105 struggle with similar questions. Much of our
doctrinal framework could be disrupted by the rise of the machines.
In short, substantive law scholars have recognized the growing need to
incorporate the challenges robots pose to our doctrinal thinking. Yet, despite this
need, procedural scholarship has not similarly responded.

96

See generally Chris Odinet, Consumer Bitcredit and Marketplace Lending, 69 ALA.
L. REV. 781 (2018) (describing how a newly emergent sector of the financial services
industry uses machine learning algorithms in the context of loan underwriting to score a
borrower’s credit application).
97
See generally Chagal-Feferkorn, supra note 23, at 2 (discussing how algorithmic
decision-makers may face tort claims.).
98
See, e.g., Bridy, supra note 30, at 21 (noting that robots, even if authors-in-fact,
cannot hold copyrights because they have no legal personhood); see also About Magenta,
supra note 30 (“Magenta is a Google Brain project to ask and answer the questions, ‘Can we
use machine learning to create compelling art and music?’”).
99
See PLOTKIN, supra note 31, at 51–52 (noting that a company used a “Creativity
Machine” to generate patentable innovations).
100
See generally Casey & Niblett, supra note 25 (discussing the theoretical implications
of self-driving contracts).
101
Roth, Machine Testimony, supra note 24, at 1972 (“[The article] explains why
machine sources can be ‘witnesses’ under the Sixth Amendment . . . .”); see also Roth, Trial
by Machine, supra note 24, at 1245 (exploring “the rise of ‘machines’ in criminal
adjudication”).
102
See, e.g., Prodhan, supra note 27 (noting the EU’s plan to make robots ‘electronic
persons’ for tax purposes under draft plan).
103
Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision
Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1147–48 (2017) (“When
machine-learning technology is properly understood, its use by government agencies can
comfortably fit within conventional legal parameters.”); cf. Melissa Mortazavi, Rulemaking
Ex
Machina,
117
COLUM.
L.
REV.
ONLINE
202
(2018),
https://columbialawreview.org/content/rulemaking-ex-machina/ [https://perma.cc/P9KN4822] (examining the “key ways that automation can support or hinder the legal exercise of
agency action.”).
104
See generally Sharkey et al., supra note 29, at 116 (noting how police departments
increasingly rely on robots for police functions).
105
See, e.g., MORAVEC, supra note 28, at 132–34, 139–41 (arguing that antitrust law
must limit the growth and extent of fully automated corporations run entirely by robots).
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Civil procedure scholarship has simply overlooked the need to deliberate
carefully and early about the impending changes in how robots interact with society
and fail to interact with well-established, but increasingly outdated pillars of
procedural thinking that were designed long before autonomous robots were
imaginable. The following sections aim to make strides to fix this lacuna, first by
providing broad analytical frameworks and then by offering concrete proposals.
II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS
There are many types of legally relevant entities out there roaming the legal
savannah. Some, like corporations, have been with us for centuries.106 Others, like
for-profit public benefit corporations, are more recent inventions.107 The law needs
to account for all of them, if only, sometimes, to decide to ignore them. But before
judges, legislators, and academics can evaluate substantive and procedural
treatments, they must utilize an analytical framework to make sense of an entity.
Tacitly or explicitly, the shape of the analytical framework underlies all questions
of legal treatment.
There is a great temptation to default into a framework without acknowledging
such a choice or questioning its implications. All too often, this choice goes
unnoticed and unarticulated, with wide-ranging consequences. The chosen
analytical framework drives answers to questions large and small, from abstract
discussions of policy, to evaluations of principles and standards, down to the nittygritty of statutory construction and rule interpretation.
This section will identify and explain three ideal-type analytical frameworks to
evaluate entities in general and robots in particular. The first approach is ontological,
answering question about the litigation status of robots based on their essential
nature. The second approach is deontological, grounding litigation rights in moral
obligations we have or do not have toward robots. The last is functional, asking
about the practical effects of treating robots as separate from their owners.
These frameworks can be utilized in all substantive areas of law. For example,
a tort scholar might use them to evaluate whether a robot can form the intent to
trespass. However, given the aims of this Article, I will focus on procedural
questions and examples drawn from the history of procedure.
Preferences of one framework over another affect how we resolve fundamental
questions about the role of robots in litigation. Because of this latent influence, it is
important to make explicit the conceptual machinery of each framework, its appeal,
and its problems.

106

Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2
HARV. L. REV. 105 (1888).
107
See, e.g., Kevin V. Tu, Socially-Conscious Corporations and Shareholder Profit, 84
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 125 (2016) (“In response to the perception that corporate law does
not adequately facilitate the needs of socially conscious corporations, thirty states and the
District of Columbia have enacted Benefit Corporation statutes. These statutes adopt the
‘Benefit Corporation’ as a new class of corporation under state law.” (citations omitted)).
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A. Ontological
One way we could approach the question of how to treat robots is to ask what
they are. This approach asserts that the essential nature of a thing can guide our
thinking about that thing.108 For example, nobody asks about the role of rocks in
litigation because their essential nature is passive and unfeeling. Rocks share few
fundamental attributes with entities (like persons or corporations) that can and do
litigate.109 I will first sketch the argumentative structure of such ontological
arguments, then illustrate the use of ontological thinking that led courts and
commentators to grant corporations (but not animals or plants) litigation rights,
before turning to the strengths and weaknesses of ontological thinking as applied to
robots.
Ontology is a branch of metaphysics.110 It is concerned with the nature of being,
the types of entities that exist, their properties, and relations. As one of the oldest
area of philosophical inquiry, the ontology literature is filled with obscure and
abstract questions. However, ontology also captures a common and concrete
approach to solve problems in the world. To understand how to deal with a new type
of object, ask first about its fundamental nature and then analogize its core attributes
to objects you already know. For example, in the early 1990s, commentators and
courts inquired into the fundamental nature of the Internet to solve legal problems.111
Is the Internet at heart a kind of common space? Or is the essence of the Internet that
it is not locatable in any specific locale? These are abstract, ontological questions,
but they have real consequences for how courts think about jurisdiction,112 choice of
108

See Calo, Lessons of Cyberlaw, supra note 22, at 549 (“[T]transformative
technologies tend to have essential qualities that drive the legal and policy conversations that
attend them.”).
109
See Pater Kahn, Jr. et al., The New Ontological Category Hypothesis in HumanRobot Interaction, 2011 PROC. 6TH INT’L CONF. ON HUMAN-ROBOT INTERACTION 159, 160
(2011) (“For the most part, people are not confused about how to categorize most entities in
the world. We do not, for example, talk to a brick wall and expect it to talk back, nor do we
attribute to it mental capabilities or think of it as a possible friend. But robots appear
different.”).
110
And as such distinct from epistemology, ethics, or aesthetics.
111
See, e.g., Edias Software Int’l v. Basis Int’l, 947 F. Supp. 413, 419 (D. Ariz. 1996)
(“The Internet can be described by a number of different metaphors, all fitting for different
features and services that it provides. For example, the Internet resembles a highway,
consisting of many streets leading to places where a user can find information. The metaphor
of the Internet as a shopping mall or supermarket, on the other hand, aptly describes the
Internet as a place where the user can shop for goods, information, and services. Finally, the
Internet also can be viewed as a telephone system for computers by which data bases of
information can be downloaded to the user, as if all the information existed in the user’s
computer’s disc drive.” (citations omitted)).
112
See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 13–
25 (1996) (examining personal jurisdiction doctrine in the context of cyberspace); Allan R.
Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of
Regulatory Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 411–12 (2004).
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law,113 taxation, free speech, 114 and much more.115 Sometimes, ontological thinking
happens explicitly, but frequently such thinking is short-circuited into single terms
that do the heavy conceptual lifting. For example, the term “cyberspace” suggests
an electronic analogy to a physical space. Use of that term can implicitly or explicitly
justify treatment of the Internet as a kind of locale based on the postulated essential
nature of the Internet as a quasi-physical space.
Ontological arguments have been used in the context of civil procedure for a
long time. One of the clearest examples of this type of thinking concerns
corporations. At the founding of the republic, few corporations existed.116 Within a
few decades, they spread across the U.S. economy. Courts were quickly confronted
with puzzling questions about how civil procedure should treat corporations. Many
courts resorted to ontological arguments. They asked what a corporation “is,”
inquiring into a corporation’s essential nature and attributes. Courts, over time, gave
different answers to this ontological question. At times, they treated corporations
akin to individuals working together (i.e., roughly large partnerships). At other
times, they conceived of the essential nature of corporations as akin to the essential
nature of a person because a corporation makes decisions and exhibits agency that
cannot be reduced to the agency of the people who own the corporation. These
answers about the ontological status of corporations then drove the procedural rights
and opportunities afforded to corporations.117

113

See, e.g., Damon C. Andrews & John M. Newman, Personal Jurisdiction and
Choice of Law in the Cloud, 73 MD. L. REV. 313, 313–14 (2013).
114
See, e.g., Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 434 (2d Cir. 2001).
115
See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO.
L.J. 357 (2003) (discussing the internal and external perspectives of Internet law).
116
See Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American
Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1443 (1987) (“Business corporations, of which there were
only a handful when America adopted the constitution, grew in size and number as the
country expanded and exploited its resources.”).
117
See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
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Similar ontological arguments, some successful and some not, were made to
define the litigation status of cities118 and more recently of animals,119 plants,
rivers,120 and other objects.121
Thinking about the role of robots in litigation could proceed along similar
lines.122 Using this framework, one first asks about the fundamental nature of a
robot.123 Perhaps the core of robot-ness is autonomous decision-making;124 or
servility, cold rationality, soullessness, or mechanical robustness?125 Popular culture
furnishes many examples of stories that emphasize different aspects of each
fundamental trait. A focus on any of these traits could furnish a foundation for a
different assessment of litigation-worthiness. Autonomous decision-making, for
118
See generally Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057
(1980) (examining how the law contributes to the powerlessness of cities); Sarah Lynnda
Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1227 (2018) (discussing how plaintiff cities are
legally, morally, and sociologically legitimate).
119
See, e.g., Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248, 249 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2014) (plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that chimpanzees should be treated as legal
persons for some purposes); see also Ian E. Waldick, Comment, Let Willy Free Himself: The
Case for Expanding Standing to Marine Mammals to Challenge Regulations of the Public
Display Industry, 31 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 117, 117–48 (2015).
120
See Julie Turkewitz, Corporations Have Rights. Why Shouldn’t Rivers? N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/us/does-the-colorado-river-haverights-a-lawsuit-seeks-to-declare-it-a-person.html
[https://perma.cc/BL42-YBFP]
(describing a lawsuit that “ask[s] a judge to recognize the Colorado River as a person.”).
121
Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Revisited: How Far Will Law
and Morals Reach? A Pluralist Perspective, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1985) (cataloging
lawsuits filed “in the name or interest of nonhumans—including a river, a marsh, a brook, a
beach, a national monument, a commons, a tree, and a species—with somewhat ambiguous
results.” (citations omitted)).
122
See generally Calo, Lessons of Cyberlaw, supra note 22, at 515 (“The essential
qualities of robotics will drive a distinct conversation.” (emphasis added)).
123
One important implication of this approach is that it is supposed to look beyond
superficial traits and build on more fundamental aspects of a robot being. Most notably, this
approach avoids inquiring into whether a robot takes a humanoid physical manifestation or
not. Notice however that human-like appearance is a vital aspect of our typical thinking about
robots. Notice furthermore that most robots are not just modeled on generic humans, but
male humans. Female robots are rare and trigger their own (questionable) tropes of seduction
and deceit. Amazingly, studies suggest that people discriminate more against robots with
feminine names than male names. See Benedict Tiong Chee Tay et al., When Stereotypes
Meet Robots: The Effect of Gender Stereotypes on People’s Acceptance of a Security Robot,
in ENGINEERING PSYCHOLOGY AND COGNITIVE ERGONOMICS: UNDERSTANDING HUMAN
COGNITION 261 (Donald Harris ed., 2013).
124
Cf. SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS
ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 11–13 (2011) (emphasizing the “intentional stance” of robots in relation
to a “legal theory for autonomous agents.”).
125
Cf. Calo, Lessons of Cyberlaw, supra note 22, at 549 (“The essential, distinguishing
facets of robotics portend a new set of challenges centered around embodying data,
harnessing unpredictability, and disentangling person from instrument.”).
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example, suggests an intellectual capacity expected of litigants. Mechanical
robustness, in contrast, does not.126
This points to the strengths and weaknesses of ontological approaches to
litigation capacity. The main strength is that this approach is intuitive, and perhaps
on some level, inescapable.127 To answer what litigation capacity entity Z has, of
course, we would like to know more about the essential qualities of Z.
The main downside of this approach, as the example above suggests, is that it
lacks determinacy.128 Depending on which attributes we focus on, we receive
diametrically opposed prescriptions. This would be less of a problem if the
underlying attributes were not controversial, but here they are. At heart, we are
comparing non-humans to humans and inquire about the essential attributes of
personhood.129 That might just be one of the most contentious concepts in our culture
as exemplified in another context by debates about whether to characterize fetuses
as persons.130
As such, ontological arguments lack determinacy and often appear either as
circular or elaborate smoke-screens for deontological or functional arguments.
B. Deontological
A different approach to ontological thinking is deontological thinking.131
Rather than focusing on the nature of robots, this approach focuses on the moral
duties we have toward robots (the answer might be none) and the people who want
to sue robots. This approach inquires into what kind of treatments are morally
126

See also Kahn, Jr. et al., supra note 109, at 159–60 (arguing that robots occupy an
ontological middle-ground somewhere between object and agent).
127
For example, artificial intelligence systems themselves rely on a model of
knowledge about a domain of objects and their attributes and relations. See generally Thomas
R. Gruber, A Translation Approach to Portable Ontology Specifications, 5 KNOWLEDGE
ACQUISITION 199, 199 (1993) (“To support the sharing and reuse of formally represented
knowledge among AI systems, it is useful to define the common vocabulary in which shared
knowledge is represented. A specification of a representational vocabulary for a shared
domain of discourse — definitions of classes, relations, functions, and other objects — is
called an ontology.”).
128
Cf. Calo, Lessons of Cyberlaw, supra note 22, at 529 (“Few complex technologies
have a single, stable, uncontested definition. Robots are no exception. There is some measure
of consensus, however, around the idea that robots are mechanical objects that take the world
in, process what they sense, and in turn act upon the world.”).
129
Id. at 515. (“Robotics blurs the very line between people and instrument.”).
130
See, e.g., Jonathan F. Will et al., Personhood Seeking New Life with Republican
Control, 93 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (noting various legislative attempts at the federal
and state level to “provide that the rights associated with legal personhood begin at
fertilization.”).
131
I focus on deontological thinking as the strongest candidate within moral philosophy
for the task at hand. Others, conceivably, will prefer arguments based on aretaic theories or
consequentialists theories (accounted for, in part, in this and the next section, see infra
Section II.C.).
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permitted, required, or forbidden.132 Instead of focusing on traits that robots might
possess, this normative approach focuses on moral obligations and duties.133
Deontological thinking is frequently explained by contrasting it with
consequentialist thinking.134 Consequentialists evaluate choices by the outcomes
they produce.135 If the outcome is bringing about more “good” (however defined),
then the choice is morally compelling.136 If the outcome reduces the overall good,
then the choice is undesirable.137
Deontologists question this singular focus with outcomes.138 If outcomes are all
that mattered, then sometimes killing or hurting innocents might be justified,
perhaps even morally required. A frequently used example of this critique postulates
a doctor who has two dying patients in urgent need of organs. The doctor also has
one healthy patient whose organs could save the other two. Some have argued that
consequentialism demands that the healthy patient be killed to save the other two.139
Deontological thinking can be understood as a rejection of the basic premise of
consequentialism. Deontologists hold that moral judgment requires a focus on duties
and obligations that are independent of outcomes.140 Some actions are right and
morally required, whether they improve the overall “good” or not. Some things are
forbidden and some required. Right takes priority over Good. By rejecting an
analysis of effects, deontologists refocus morality on the moral norm to avoid evil.
The main attraction of deontological thinking is that it accounts for a sense of moral
duty that many people feel independent of elaborate calculations of consequences.
Killing is wrong—period.141
The main downside of deontological normativity is that it is indeterminate in
content and scope. Just as much about consequentialism depends on how we define
the “good” to be maximized by our choices, much about deontology depends on
what counts as moral evil and moral duty. Even if there were widespread agreement
132
LARRY ALEXANDER & MICHAEL MOORE, Deontological Ethics, in THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 2 (Edward N. Zalta, ed., Winter 2016 ed.).
133
Id. § 3.
134
See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893,
894 (2000) (noting that deontologists believe that “[t]here are some acts that are morally
wrong despite producing a net positive balance of consequences . . .”).
135
ALEXANDER & MOORE, supra note 132, § 1.
136
Id.
137
This makes it easy for consequentialist to deal with robots. Often, the “good” to be
maximized is happiness. Since robots cannot be happy, they are beyond consequentialist
normative theories. Similarly, since robots have no capacity to “suffer” or experience “pain,”
they are not included in the calculus of minimizing pain (unlike animals). See PETER SINGER,
ANIMAL LIBERATION: A NEW ETHICS FOR OUR TREATMENT OF ANIMALS 8–9 (1975).
138
There are of course many other critiques of consequentialism.
139
See generally Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395
(1985) (discussing various scenarios wherein consequentialism requires a holistic approach).
140
Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 252–53 (1996).
141
Interestingly, humans are currently hard at work to teach robots moral duties. See,
e.g., NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES 185 (2014)
(discussing efforts to instill our core moral values into artificial agents).
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about what counts as a moral duty, its scope is not clear. Do robots have moral
standing? Does permanently turning off a robot count as killing a robot?
We do have moral duties towards other humans, of course. If robots were like
humans, then they would similarly be under the umbrella of deontological derived
moral duties. And the human-like look of many robots makes it tempting to
anthropomorphize robots.142 However, human-like appearances do not make
something human.143 That said, non-human-like entities might someday have traits
(other than appearance) that entitle them to human-like treatment.144 While unlikely,
no account should foreclose the possibility that non-humans deserve some aspects
of human-like treatment. More troubling still, the law is already willing to treat nonhumans such as corporations to some extent as moral agents. For example,
corporations can incur criminal liability.145 Computer scientists and moral
philosophers, meanwhile, are creating the emerging field of “computational ethics”
to build morality into robots.146 Their hope is to create “artificial moral agents.”147
Given the indeterminacy in content and scope, deontological thinking, though
intuitive to many, is of limited usefulness in determining the litigation-rights of nonhumans.

142

See generally Kate Darling, ‘Who’s Johnny?’ Anthropomorphic Framing in HumanRobot Interaction, Integration, and Policy, in ROBOT ETHICS 2.0: FROM AUTONOMOUS CARS
TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 173, (Patrick Lin et al. eds. 2017) (emphasizing how people
have a tendency to project life-like qualities onto robots that can be enhanced by
anthropomorphizing robots through personified name or story); KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 36
(“[AI] has a long history of exploiting our natural tendency to anthropomorphize objects that
look or act like us in order to attract attention and increase funding.”).
143
See Neil Richards & William Smart, How Should the Law Think About Robots?, in
ROBOT LAW 4 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016) (“Finally, we argue that one particularly
seductive metaphor for robots should be rejected at all costs: the idea that robots are ‘just
like people’ . . . [w]e call this idea ‘the Android Fallacy.’”).
144
See generally F. Patrick Hubbard, “Do Androids Dream?”: Personhood and
Intelligent Artifacts, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 405 (2011) (arguing that artificial entities should be
granted a legal right to personhood if they display the capacities for complex thought and
communication, a sense of being a self, and an ability to live in a community).
145
See, e.g., Guilty Plea Agreement at 14–15, United States of America v. BP
Exploration & Production, Inc., No. 2:12-cr-00292-SSV-DEK (E.D. LA. Jan. 29, 2013)
(admitting to negligently causing the deaths of eleven men and the resulting oil spill).
146
See Cristina Baroglio et al., Special Issue: Computational Ethics and Accountability,
18 ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET TECH. 40, 40 (2018);
see also ISAAC ASIMOV, I, ROBOT 44–45 (1942) (describing the seminal Three Laws of
Robotics: “[a] robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being
to come to harm . . . [a] robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where
such orders would conflict with the First Law . . . a robot must protect its own existence as
long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Laws.”).
147
See generally Laura Pana, Artificial Ethics: A Common Way for Human and
Artificial Moral Agents and an Emergent Technoethical Field, 3 INT’L J. TECHNOETHICS 1
(discussing ethics as applied to both humans and artificial moral agents).
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C. Functional
The strongest stand-alone candidate for a conceptual framework that can
resolve the question of robots in civil litigation is a functional account. It asks about
the practical effects of treating robots as separate from their owners for litigation
purposes.148 Does such treatment serve a useful function? This approach shifts our
analytical focus away from the lofty realms of philosophy to the pressing and
concrete demands and effects of litigation.
Instead of asking about the fundamental nature of robots or whether they are
due moral standing, this approach is agnostic towards ontological and deontological
questions. Robots’ deep essence might one day resemble the essence of humans—
or not. Robots might deserve rights—or not. The functional approach sidesteps these
(perhaps unanswerable) questions and asks instead about the practical effects of
treating robots as separate from their owners for litigation purposes.149 How would
this change litigation when an autonomous truck strikes a pedestrian at the
intersection of Main Street and Erie Street? Would it be for the better or worse?
Courts and legislators have engaged in a functional argument about artificial
personhood before when dealing with the emergence of corporations. Corporate
personhood in litigation is clearly a legal fiction. Corporations have no soul to
condemn, no body to punish,150 can live forever unlike humans,151 and do not have
sentimental feelings towards a house where their child took first steps that leads
them to call that place home. And yet, civil procedure routinely anthropomorphizes
corporations and asks where they are “essentially at home” for personal jurisdiction
purposes,152 and where they are “citizens” for subject matter jurisdiction purposes.153

148

As such, in can be understood as a modified consequentialist account.
See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Essay, Legal Personhood for Artificial
Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1232 (1992) (arguing that “only some of the claims
made in the debate over the possibility of AI do make a pragmatic difference, and it is the
pragmatic differences that ought to be decisive.”).
150
John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 459 (1981).
151
See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (“Being
the mere creature of law, [the corporation] possesses only those properties which the charter
of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very
existence . . . . Among the most important are immortality, and, . . . individuality . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
152
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (“A court
may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to
hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous
and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” (emphasis added)).
153
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010) (holding that the statutory phrase “a
corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State . . . where it has a principal place of
business” means “the place where the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and
coordinate the corporation’s activities.” (quoting in part 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012))).
149
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Commentators154 and courts155 have recognized that this artificial personhood
metaphor is silly, but they have also successfully argued that it is useful. It serves an
important function.
That function is to integrate lawsuits by and against corporations into the wellestablished procedural framework (developed originally for humans) without
causing debilitating disruptions. The courts, legislators, and rule-makers believed
that avoiding the need to create entity-specific procedures was worth some
metaphorical fudging.156
This is a noble goal, but it comes at a price. The bending of metaphors like
“home” and “citizen” is not only confusing, but it introduces into well-established
doctrines inconsistencies and incoherence. Personal jurisdiction doctrine works
reasonably well for persons, but is in disarray in large part because of its uneasy
extension to corporations. For example, “presence” is one of the cornerstone
concepts of personal jurisdiction doctrine.157 Courts have repeatedly asked what it
would mean for a corporation to be “present.”158 For humans that is a relatively easy
inquiry: you are present where your body is located.159 But corporations do not have
a body. They are only “present” insofar as human actors working on behalf of the
corporation make them present. This has raised endless debates about which human
actors, doing what kind of things, in what context, suffice for a corporation to be
“present” in a forum.160
154

See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 810–11 (1935) (arguing that “[n]obody has ever seen a corporation.
What right have we to believe in corporations if we don’t believe in angels? To be sure, some
of us have seen corporate funds, corporate transactions, etc. . . . [b]ut this does not give us
the right to hypostatize, to ‘thingify,’ the corporation, and to assume that it travels about from
State to State as mortal men travel.” And suggesting it would be much better to inquire into
“political or ethical value judgments as to the propriety of putting financial burdens upon
corporations . . . .”).
155
See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (accepting that,
“[s]ince the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be acted upon as
though it were a fact, . . . it is clear that unlike an individual its ‘presence’ without, as well
as within, the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf
by those who are authorized to act for it.” (citation omitted)).
156
See generally Roger Michalski, Trans-Personal Procedures, 47 CONN. L. REV. 321
(2014).
157
See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (holding generally that a court
can exert personal jurisdiction over a party if that party was served while physically present
within the state).
158
See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. 326 U.S. at 316–17 (1945) (“To say that the corporation is
so far ‘present’ there as to satisfy due process requirements, for purposes of taxation or the
maintenance of suits against it in the courts of the state, is to beg the question to be decided.
For the terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ are used merely to symbolize those activities of the
corporation’s agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the
demands of due process.”).
159
Arguably the Internet has complicated even this inquiry.
160
Since robots have a physical manifestation, their “presence” will often be easier to
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On balance, courts and legislators decided that treating corporations mostly like
humans for litigation purposes serves important functions. It makes litigation
predictable and uniform while protecting litigation speed and cost.161 A functional
account allows for such a weighing of procedural values in ways that ontological
and deontological accounts do not.
It allows us to measure and compare the consequences of non-property
treatment for robots. The effects of such potential robot litigation take place in two
settings. The first is the courtroom itself. Any account of robot litigation must
articulate and weigh how suing robots directly would interact with the practical and
abstract issues of litigation. On the practical side, people pursuing a functional
approach must account for how robotic entities are compatible (or not) with longstanding jurisdictional doctrines, service of process difficulties, the availability and
scope of remedies, the scope of res judicata doctrines, and the hundreds of other
nitty-gritty vital minutia of procedure. On the abstract side, functional accounts of
robot litigation must account for broad procedural values to be protected and
weighted against each other like speed, cost, accuracy, finality, fairness,
accessibility, simplicity, privacy, and participation.162 Ideally a procedural system
would further all these values, but alas, often trade-offs between these values are
inevitable. Robot litigation would likely require a re-balancing of these procedural
values.163
The second setting where the availability of robot litigation has an effect is
outside of the courtroom. Litigation rules do not only impact what happens in the
courtroom. Instead, litigation rules affect conduct long before and after lawsuits are
contemplated and filed.164 For example, stringent pleading standards165 might make
it more tempting to engage in antitrust behavior because of less fear of effective
enforcement. As such, a functional account helps us evaluate how litigation rules
shape primary conduct.

determine. But cf. infra Section IV.C.
161
See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (2015) (instructing that the rules “should be
construed, administered, and employed . . . to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.”).
162
See generally Roger Michalski, The Clash of Procedural Values, 22 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 61 (2018).
163
For example, treating robots simply as property would certainly be simple and keep
doctrinal confusion at bay, but might make it increasingly difficult for harmed individuals to
access courts to obtain relief (as the examples in the introduction illustrated). See generally
Calo, Lessons of Cyberlaw, supra note 22, at 537 (“[T]he law will face the question, maybe
soon, and likely often, of what to do when a digital object made up of bits becomes a physical
object made up of atoms. . . . [T]he set of compromises we have in place today—the balances
lawmakers, courts, and regulators have struck—will plausibly unwind in the coming
decades.”).
164
See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting
that litigation rules might “substantially affect . . . primary decisions respecting human
conduct . . . .”).
165
See generally Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

1052

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

In the context of robot litigation such effects on primary conduct could take
multiple forms. Most notably, it might affect whether companies hire robots or
humans to do their work. If robots make it difficult to establish personal jurisdiction
over a company in an unfavorable forum, this might tip a company’s decision away
from hiring humans in that forum. Similarly, the contours of robot litigation rules
might affect whether work is performed locally by a company from nearby or from
abroad.
All in all, a functional account is uniquely suited to account for the economic,
social, and political consequences of integrating robots into civil litigation or
continuing to treat them as mere property. In contrast, ontological and deontological
thinking can resemble an empty vessel into which we pour our policy-preferences,
biases, hopes, and prejudices all in the name of essential claims of existence or
thoughts.
That is not to say that ontological and deontological thinking have no role to
play. An ideal model of robot litigation would satisfy ontological and deontological
and functional requirements. However, such a model is unlikely. Realistically, we
must settle for reasonable trade-offs between these three analytical approaches. To
receive widespread acceptance, a model of robot litigation must be above a minimal
threshold on all three analytical frameworks, and a good match on at least one. The
next section will go on the hunt for a model of robot litigation that satisfies this test.
III. POSSIBLE MODELS
This Part applies the ontological, deontological, and functional frameworks to
evaluate numerous concrete contestant models for treating non-humans as litigation
entities. The possibilities are broad,166 ranging from treating robots for litigation
purposes as employees, slaves, franchisees, subsidiaries, children, animals, agents,
or subcontractors. Each will be evaluated in turn. The resulting taxonomy exposes
the weaknesses of analogizing robots to established models. None fits, and all would
have negative practical consequences.167 As courts will encounter more litigation
involving robots, they will likely try to fit robots into one of these models. It is
therefore important to dispel these attempts before case law builds up in favor of one
of these models.
This Part concludes by exposing the great Faustian bargain inherent in treating
robots as something other than property. Analogizing robots to an existing model
would make enforcement of laws easier, but would also lower how much can be
recovered in enforcement.

166
See generally SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 306–08 (P.J. Fitzgerald ed., 12th ed.
1966) (“[L]egal personality is not limited by any logical necessity, or indeed by any obvious
requirement of expedience, to the incorporation of bodies of individual persons.”).
167
The discussion is focused on procedure. I will leave aside here whether these models
might make sense in other contexts (e.g., tort, contract, antitrust, etc.). See infra Part IV.
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A. The Default: Robots as Property or Things
The current default model is that robots are things without independent
litigation status. Robots are property. To sue a robot is to sue its owner. Robots have
no separate status from their owners.
This conception of robots as mere property has important consequences in
procedure. For example, property alone cannot serve as an independent basis for
personal jurisdiction.168 An autonomous robot driving around in Montana cannot, on
its own, create the basis for Montana courts to assert jurisdiction over the robot. As
the Supreme Court argued in the seminal case of Shaffer v. Heitner, “[t]he phrase,
‘judicial jurisdiction over a thing,’ is a customary elliptical way of referring to
jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.”169 As such, Montana courts
would have to analyze the contacts of the robot’s owners with Montana to determine
whether its courts could hear the case consistent with constitutional limitations on
their powers.170
The robot’s presence in Montana, while not an automatic way to gain
jurisdiction in Montana, could still be used to establish jurisdiction in Montana.
However, only in a roundabout way. Plaintiffs would need to argue that the presence
of the robot indicates contacts between the robot’s owner and Montana in relation to
the lawsuit at hand that satisfy the minimum contacts test. This might be doable if
the controversy is about the ownership of the robot itself.171 But it might be very
difficult or impossible where the autonomous robot caused harm (say, in a highway
accident).
Since the robot is mere property, it cannot have intent, it cannot establish
independent contacts with Montana, and it cannot avail itself of the benefits and
protections of Montana. Only the robot’s owner can do that. But since the robot
acted autonomously, there never was the need for the robot’s owner to intend
anything in Montana, to establish contacts with Montana, or to purposefully avail
herself of anything in Montana.

168

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (“The fiction that an assertion of
jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the
property supports an ancient form without substantial modern justification. Its continued
acceptance would serve only to allow state-court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to
the defendant.”).
169
Id. at 207 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56
introductory note (1971)).
170
Id. (“[I]n order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction
must be sufficient to justify exercising ‘jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.’”
(citations omitted)).
171
Id. (“[T]he presence of property in a State may bear on the existence of jurisdiction
by providing contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation. For example,
when claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the
plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State where the property is located
not to have jurisdiction.” (citations omitted)).
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Similarly, the robot by itself is not “at home” anywhere for general jurisdiction.
Only the owner (a person or corporation) might be at home in a U.S. jurisdiction.
Thus, even if the robot was created in Montana, spent all of its time in Montana,
worked in Montana, used Montanan roads and services, it still is not “at home” in
Montana and Montana’s courts cannot exert general jurisdiction over the robot.
The conception of robots as property thus provides a shield to the robot’s owner
that makes it difficult for plaintiffs to sue the robot or its owner in Montana. If the
robot’s owner is foreign, perhaps no domestic court would be available for such a
plaintiff.
Similarly, treating robots as property has ramifications across the procedural
spectrum: robots cannot have citizenship for diversity jurisdiction purposes, are not
contemplated by long-arm and venue statutes, are not part of the forum non
conveniens analysis,172 cannot be sanctioned for spoliation of evidence, and have no
ability to be implead nor the capacity to plead. Furthermore, there is no mechanism
to serve process on a robot, no choice-of-law preferences, and no other procedural
doctrine, statute, or rule that enables, hinders, or facilitates robot litigation.
To sue a robot is thus currently like suing a car that hit you on the intersection.
You figure out who owns the car and sue that person. This stands in sharp contrast
to injuries caused by corporations. In those instances, the suit is not against the
owners of the corporation, but the corporation directly. The justifications for this
difference are manifold. First, separate corporate existence provides a liability
limitation that encourages investment in corporations and overall economic activity.
Liability of a corporation is (typically) limited to the assets of the corporation, not
the assets of the owners of the corporation.173 A person who buys stock in a large
corporation must only fear losing the value of that stock, not that litigants could
come to satisfy judgments against the corporation with the assets of the stockholder.
A second reason for treating corporate litigation separate from the owners is
litigation ease. For example, serving process on corporations is relatively easy,
cheap, and straight-forward.174 Serving process on everybody who has a stake in the
corporation, in contrast, would be anything but.
This discussion points to the appeal and downside of treating robots as property.
On the ontological side, it is intuitive to treat robots as property for litigation
purposes because they are property. They are things that can be bought, sold,
activated, deactivated, or modified. As with all chattel, so the argument goes, there
is no role in litigation for robots separate from their owners. The rebuttal is that
robots are a strange and perhaps new kind of chattel—property that can or soon will
be able to act autonomously in meaningful ways. Some robots appear to make
172

Except perhaps under the prong testing for “relative ease of access to sources of
proof.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981).
173
See, e.g., John A. Swain & Edwin E. Aguilar, Piercing the Veil to Assert Personal
Jurisdiction Over Corporate Affiliates: An Empirical Study of the Cannon Doctrine, 84 B.U.
L. REV. 445, 446 (2004) (noting that limited liability is the “bedrock proposition of corporate
law that a shareholder’s risk of loss is generally limited to the amount of the shareholder’s
investment.”).
174
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h).
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decisions that cannot be traced back in any straightforward manner to their owners.
The result is that people might not be able to tell whether the car next to them is
driven by a human or an autonomous robot. That puts robots, one might argue, into
a new kind of property category. I doubt that will affect anytime soon whether robots
can or cannot be sold, but robot autonomy suggests an ontological status beyond
what a traditional, non-autonomous car might enjoy.
This ontological tension is on a spectrum. Currently, treating robots as property
is uncontroversial and most robots do not differ in fundamental ways from more
traditional machines. However, if robots grow more autonomous, their litigation
status as property will seem increasingly antiquated.
Technological advances will likely make the treatment of robots as property for
litigation purposes seem increasingly out of touch. Perhaps robots cannot, on some
fundamental level, form intent (to establish contacts with a forum for personal
jurisdiction purposes or form an intent to establish a domicile somewhere). But they
can act in ways and contexts where ascribing intent has intuitive, and perhaps one
day popular, appeal. That would undermine our treatment of robots as chattel for
litigation purposes.
The main functional reasons why robots might not be treated as chattel is that
such treatment within the current doctrinal framework makes it difficult and
expensive for injured parties to recover. The widespread use of autonomous robots
will likely provide a new economic bounty,175 but this bounty will be accompanied
by endless robot malfunctions and mishaps. The law will have to provide an answer
for who should bear the significant burden for robot accidents and litigation
involving robots.
Procedure is part of the answer because no amount of substantive law remedies
is useful if concrete plaintiffs cannot invoke the courts to access such remedies.
Treatment of robots as property will make it easier for the owners of autonomous
robots to deploy robot workers from distant states or countries with little fear of
litigation in unfavorable forums where their robots might have caused harm.
Plaintiffs will find it difficult to pursue remedies close to home and states will find
it difficult to tax and regulate foreign robots. A treatment of robots as something
other than property for litigation purposes might make it easier for injured parties to
recover for their injuries.
There is, however, a significant downside to treating robots as something other
than property of their owners. While such treatment might make it easier to satisfy
jurisdictional hurdles and choice-of-law limitations, it could also limit how much
plaintiffs could recover. The tradeoff, as the following sections will show, is often
between ease of recovery and extent of recovery.
B. Corporate Variations
Another model is to treat robots like corporations. Like robots, corporations are
inherently human owned (directly or indirectly), controlled by humans, and can exist
175

See supra notes 83–87.

1056

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

for a broad spectrum of purposes.176 Even if we do not treat robots like corporations,
robots will still likely confront the law as corporations with increased frequency. As
others have pointed out, “wrapping each synthetic intellect in its own legal
corporation” is easy and cheap to do.177 Incorporating robots “as an asset of its own
legal entity” would insulate assets from liability to prevent “a single catastrophic
[robot] mistake to bankrupt [an] entire enterprise.”178 While clearly beneficial to the
owner of the robot, this approach of wrapping robots in corporate blankets leaves
parties injured by the catastrophic mistake with no or limited ability to collect
damages. Their suffering would, in effect, subsidize robot ownership and
experimentation.
The main appeal of treating robots like corporations is that civil procedure has
well-established and efficient means for dealing with corporate litigants. For
example, corporations are citizens for diversity jurisdiction purposes in their state of
incorporation and their “principal place of business.”179 Robots, similarly, could be
deemed citizen for federal subject matter jurisdiction purposes where they were
created180 and where they conduct most of their activities.181
However, treating robots as corporations makes little sense from a corporate
law standpoint. The corporate-robot analogy fails in terms of formation, decisionmaking, and accountability. Corporations must be incorporated and must follow
state corporate law. There is nothing about robots that suggests that such processes
must be followed. I can build a robot in my garage without ever informing the state
or thinking about establishing a new kind of legal entity. I cannot incorporate a
corporation without state involvement and a high degree of intentionality.

176

Cities and municipal organizations (still sometimes called “municipal corporations”)
were and are also often analogized to corporations (and vice versa). See generally Frug,
supra note 118, at 1082 (“It must be understood that before the nineteenth century, there was
no distinction in England or in America between public and private corporations, between
businesses and cities. As a legal matter, all these corporations had the same rights.”).
177
KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 91.
178
Id.
179
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
180
Though, again, there are important boundary issues. For example, it might be
difficult to define clearly where a robot is “created.” Is it the place where a robot is first
physically assembled, where the software is first installed, where the software is last updated
(or significantly altered), where it is first booted up, where it first acts autonomously, etc.?
181
Predictably, there will also be robots that cross national borders and create new
subject matter jurisdiction puzzles. For example, when does a domestically created and
initially domestically active robot lose its US-based state citizenship when acting abroad?
(E.g. a truck that used to conduct its affairs in Minnesota but then crossed to Canada and has
been active there for months or years). Similarly, is a robot created abroad that is shipped to
the US and conducts all of its activities domestically more like a foreigner, dual-citizen,
undocumented immigrant, or permanent resident?
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The rights and protections incorporation affords are granted by states
conditional on numerous and often intricate requirements and rules. In contrast,
robots do not have and cannot have an internal governing structure akin to
corporations. Corporate decision-making rules are therefore inapplicable and
common accountability measures fail.
Similarly, because of the special relationship between a corporation and its
chart-granting state, a relationship that is absent for robots, corporate treatment is a
poor fit for robot litigation.
A related corporate template is subsidiary treatment for robots. Subsidiaries are
legal entities that are separate from their corporate owners. Civil procedure over time
has developed ways to account for subsidiaries. For example, personal jurisdiction
doctrine treats, generally, a subsidiary’s contacts with a forum as distinct from a
parent company’s contacts with that forum.182 However, there are ways to pierce the
veil between a subsidiary and the parent company and treat the contacts as
originating from the same source.183
The main appeal of modeling robot litigation on how subsidiaries are currently
integrated into the litigation process is that it provides a built-in method to probe the
level of control or independence of the parent company over the subsidiary and
assign procedural and liability consequences to that variation. For example,
plaintiffs can aggregate the jurisdictional contacts of a parent company that treats
the subsidiary simply as part of a unitary business.184 Similarly, courts could test
whether a robot is acting above a threshold of autonomy or whether the robot’s
owner effectively controls the robot. Depending on where a robot falls on that
spectrum, courts could either treat the robot as a separate jurisdictional entity (like a
true subsidiary) or aggregate jurisdictional contacts (like a subsidiary in name only
that is fully integrated into the parent company).
While tempting, treating robots as subsidiaries of their owners fails for two
reasons. The first reason is based on the difficulties of probing and assigning control
when it comes to robots. With subsidiaries, courts can examine emails and
memoranda to test whether the subsidiary acts independently or is controlled by the
parent company. With robots, a similar analysis would entail the analysis of
complex, dynamic,185 and often inscrutable code that does not lend itself to easy
182
See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 930
(2011); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 135 (2014).
183
See e.g., Jennifer A. Schwartz, Piercing the Corporate Veil of an Alien Parent for
Jurisdictional Purposes: A Proposal for a Standard that Comports with Due Process, 96
CALIF. L. REV. 731, 731–32 (2008); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An
Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1048 (1991) (“Courts pierced the veil in about
40% of reported cases.”).
184
See, e.g., Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 121–22. See generally Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen
Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies,
and Agency, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 14, 29–30 (1986) (explaining that combining parent and
subsidiary for jurisdictional purposes requires an inquiry “comparable to the corporate law
question of piercing the corporate veil.”).
185
For example, many neural network-styled robots might adapt over time to new input
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interpretation.186 For example, does tilting a robot’s neural network to seek work in
warm and humid weather show that the robot’s owner directed the robot to work in
Florida? Even if a robot’s code could be analyzed in this manner, doing so would be
time intensive and dependent on the work of extremely costly experts. In many cases
(say a run-of-the-mill car accident case), plaintiffs would be unlikely to shoulder
such costs early in the lifecycle of a case simply to establish jurisdiction.187
Beyond the difficulty of operationalizing the autonomy spectrum in actual
cases, another reason why a subsidiary-like treatment for robots fails is that it relies
on treating robots, again, as corporations (subsidiaries are by definition business
entities). For the reasons we saw above (formation, management, taxation, and
regulation), such treatment fails ontological and functional frameworks.188
C. Vicarious Entities
In agency law, a principal engages an agent to act on her behalf.189 This creates
an agency relationship. While the agent is engaged within the scope of the agreed
relationship, he is acting within the scope of his agency. The principal is responsible
for the liability the agent incurs (as agent, rather than as her private self).190 The
substantive law imputes the agent’s actions to the principal. Similarly, jurisdictional
contacts of the agent can be imputed to the principal.191 For example, the agent’s
contacts with Montana on behalf of the principal might subject the principal to suit
in Montana under a modern personal jurisdiction analysis.192
without preserving a record of the previous configuration that existed at the time of, say, an
accident.
186
This approach could also encourage robot owners to avoid clear instructions and
write inscrutable (and perhaps inefficient) code precisely to make a jurisdictional analysis
more cumbersome. This is undesirable from a policy and aesthetic perspective.
187
That is to say nothing of Rule 11 complications. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (“By
presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by signing, filing,
submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the
best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances . . . (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity
for further investigation or discovery . . . .”).
188
See supra notes 184–187 and accompanying text.
189
See generally 2A C.J.S. Agency § 34 (“An agency relationship is created when there
is mutual consent, express or implied, that the agent is to act on behalf and for the benefit of
the principal and subject to the principal’s control.”).
190
See generally id. § 410 (“A duly authorized agent may act for and bind the principal,
thereby subjecting the principal to liability.” (citations omitted)).
191
See Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 184, at 2.
192
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945) (noting that
corporate contacts are measured by the contacts “of the corporation’s agent within the state
which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process.”). But cf.
Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, The Case Against Vicarious Jurisdiction, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1023, 1032 (2004) (“I argue in these pages, against the grain of judicial and academic

2018]

HOW TO SUE A ROBOT

1059

The power of agency law in procedure is that it gives courts tools to examine
when a person’s activities can be imputed to another. That imputation hinges on the
scope of the agency and whether the person, at any given point in time, acted within
the agreed-upon scope (thus allowing imputation) or not (thus undermining
imputation).
An agent model could serve as the foundation of robot litigation by recognizing
that robots act on behalf of somebody else (their owners) but could potentially act
beyond the intent and authorization of the owners.193 For example, a robot endowed
with complex machine learning processes might one day do something that was
unanticipated (and maybe un-anticipatable) by the owner and should not be imputed
to the owner.
The fundamental problem with an agent approach to robot litigation is that
agents and principals must voluntarily consent to establish this kind of relationship.
Beyond merely providing a normative foundation for liability based on consent, this
moment of establishing an agency relationship serves to define the contours of the
agent’s authorization (and thus also the principal’s liability). But robots cannot
consent to become agents, cannot enter a mutual agreement, have no ability to
negotiate the scope of authorization, cannot dissolve the agent-principal
relationship, and cannot renegotiate the terms of the relationship. Because of the lack
of consent to become an agent, there is no normative or practical boundary to the
robot’s agency. Everything the robot does would be attributable to the principal.
This would reduce the agent model back to a property-based litigation model, adding
no analytical tools to account for the ontological, in-between status and capabilities
of robots.
Other vicarious entity models fail along the same lines. For example, robots
cannot be franchisees because they cannot consent to establish a contractually
defined relationship to the franchisor. Similarly, robots cannot be treated as
subcontractors or independent contractors because they cannot contract in any
meaningful way with their owners. Finally, robots cannot be treated as employees
for litigation purposes because of their inability to define the scope of their
employment.194

wisdom, that the use of veil piercing for jurisdictional purposes is unwarranted as a matter
of precedent and unwise as a matter of policy.”).
193
KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 73 (noting from a practical and moral but not necessarily
legal standpoint that “[w]e need to control when and where synthetic intellects (or any
electronic agent, for that matter) are permitted to act on our behalf. This need is particularly
acute when they commingle with human agents.”).
194
Cf. KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 6 (referring to robots who work beyond factory floors
as “forged laborers.”); FORD, supra note 9, at xii (noting that recent technological shifts are
challenging “our most basic assumptions,” including “that machines are tools that increase
the productivity of workers. Instead, machines themselves are turning into workers . . . .”).
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Contract-based models might be attractive to the robot’s owners (allowing, for
example, advantageous indemnification and forum selection clauses). But they
cannot serve as foundations for robot litigation models because robots cannot
provide the built-in pushback and ability to negotiate that furnishes the normative
and practical appeal of vicarious entity models.
D. Slaves
Another possible model, though a terrible one, is that of the slave.195
Antebellum laws in the United States provided detailed rules to govern the legal
status of slaves.196 These rules provided for a slave’s ability to sue and be sued and
liability rules.
All of these rules were founded on abhorrent morals and on a conceptual
contradiction: slaves were treated as property yet, unquestionably, had some agency.
Even the staunchest and blindest defenders of slavery recognized that slaves could
and often did make their own choices.197 This presented a conundrum for slave legal
codes—as property, all the slaves’ liability was ultimately the slave owner’s
liability,198 but as agents, they could engage in behavior that was disconnected from
the slave’s owner.199 Slaves were property that could change hands through wills
and contracts, but slaves were also considered persons when accused of crimes (after
all, true property cannot commit crimes). Slaves could not be a party to a lawsuit200
195

The following paragraphs are a gross simplification of a complex, dynamic, and
fluid field. Others have written far more knowledgably and thoroughly on this topic.
196
See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & F. Michael Higginbotham, “Yearning to Breathe
Free”: Legal Barriers Against and Options in Favor of Liberty in Antebellum Virginia, 68
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1213, 1223 (1993).
197
Ranging from the monumental (e.g. escaping to freedom) to the mundane
(negligently driving a horse cart).
198
See, e.g., WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE: ITS DISTINCTIVE FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND
ILLUSTRATIVE FACTS 290 (1968); Thomas D. Morris, As If the Injury Was Effected by the
Natural Elements of Air, or Fire: Slave Wrongs and the Liability of Masters, 16 L. & SOC’Y
R. 569, 569–99 (1981).
199
See, e.g., Ewing v. Thompson, 13 Mo. 132, 138 (Mo. 1850) (“The power of the
master being limited, his responsibility is proportioned accordingly. It does not extend to the
willful and wanton aggressions of the slave except where the statute has expressly
provided.”); Ingram v. Linn, 4 Tex. 266, 269 (Tex. 1849) (“[T]he master is answerable for
the misconduct and negligence of his slave when acting in the immediate employment, or
under the authority, of the master. . . . But this liability does not extend to unauthorized acts,
committed by the servant, out of the course of his employment.” (citations omitted)); Snee
v. Trice, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 345, 348 (1802) (noting the need to protect slave owners from
absolute liability that “would place all the slave-owners in the state at the mercy of their
numerous slaves, who might commit what trespasses, or be guilty of what neglects and
omissions they thought proper, to the ruin of their masters.”).
200
See, e.g., JACOB D. WHEELER, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLAVERY
197 n.1 (1837) (“It would be an idle form and ceremony to make a slave a party to a suit, by
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yet were able to sue for their freedom.201 As chattel, slaves could not hold property
yet could (at times and under constraints) have separate funds.202 Slaves could not
independently contract, but slave owners could (sometimes) be bound by the
contracts slaves made.203
Strikingly, this description and the contradictions it entails is, on first sight, a
good fit for robots. Somewhat akin to slaves, robots are property but also capable of
making (some) autonomous decisions. This is a scary and striking fit—chattel that
works for a human owner and is defined as quasi-human without legal and moral
protections.
While a fitting model in some ways, I urge courts to refuse analogizing robots
to slaves and to reject this model. Antebellum slavery codes should not serve as a
model for, really, anything. They are morally repulsive. Let’s leave them buried in
the ashes of history.204
E. Children, Incompetents, and Animals
There are, of course, numerous other possible models. They are, however,
increasingly untenable. For example, one could analogize robots to children or
incompetents.205 All are, arguably, somewhat autonomous but less capable than most
adults. Litigation rules account for this difference by specifying persons that can sue
and be sued on behalf of the minor or incompetent person.206 However, elsewhere
statutes provide that minors and incompetents have an independent jurisdictional
status from their guardians.207 Procedure, in short, conceptualizes minors and
incompetents as separate from others, but tethered to their control in litigation
matters. Robots could similarly combine elements of independence (say in
jurisdictional matters) with elements of control (say in liability matters).
the instrumentality of which he could recover nothing; or if a recovery could be had, the
instant it was recovered would belong to the master. The slave can possess nothing; he can
hold nothing. He is, therefore, not a competent party to a suit. And the same rule prevails
wherever slavery is tolerated, whether there be legislative enactments on the subject or not.”).
201
See generally LEA VANDERVELDE, REDEMPTION SONGS: SUING FOR FREEDOM
BEFORE DRED SCOTT (2014) (documenting the story of law suits by people held as slaves
who claimed that they were free).
202
Called a “peculium.”
203
See, e.g., Chastain v. Zach & Bowman, 19 S.C.L. (1 Hill) 270, 270 (1833).
204
The very attempt to analogize robots to slaves might also be disrespectful to the
suffering slaves had to endure.
205
“Incompetents” strikes me as an ill-chosen moniker. I use it here only because that
is the term used in various Rules and statutes. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e) (“Unless federal
law provides otherwise, an individual—other than a minor, an incompetent person, or a
person whose waiver has been filed—may be served in a judicial district of the United
States . . . .”).
206
FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c).
207
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2) (2012) (“[T]he legal representative of an infant or
incompetent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the infant or
incompetent.”).
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Though attractive in some ways, the model ultimately fails to meet basic
ontological and deontological thresholds.208 Robots are not young humans and not
like young humans. They will not grow up to be full adults. Even if they did, the
robot’s owners are not the robot’s parents, tasked with a special privilege and duty
to raise the next generation of humanity. Similarly, parents and society owe
incompetents special care and protections arising from their fundamental humanity
that cannot be extended to robots. As such, it would be strange indeed to extend to
robots the protections and concern afforded to minors and incompetents when it
comes to, for example, default judgments209 or the approval of settlements.210
Yet another model for robot litigation would be to treat robots like (dangerous)
animals.211 Robots are a bit like animals in that they have owners who are responsible
for them, but the law also recognizes that animals might act and cause damage on
their own. This model might be useful in other areas of law (e.g., tort) but it does not
help with procedural issues raised by robots because procedure does not provide
special rules for litigation involving animals (animals are just chattel).212
F. The Faustian Bargain
While all of the above models fail to provide workable accounts for robot
litigation, they are instructive of a Faustian bargain embedded in existing non-human
litigation. In various forms and mixtures, each model presents a tradeoff between
ease of enforcement and recovery limitation. For example, treating robots as
property would make it difficult to sue a robot with a foreign owner close to home,
but a successful suit would provide full access to the owner’s assets. Treating robots
as subsidiaries, in contrast, would make a suit against the robot close to home easier
than suing the parent, but recovery can only be had from the subsidiary robot, not
the parent.213 This would create an unnecessary hardship for parties injured by
208

As it did in other contexts, though for different reasons. For example, some courts
treated Native American Tribes as wards of the federal government. This approach implied
that the federal government could sue on behalf of tribes but the tribes could not vindicate
their rights on their own. See generally Richard B. Collins & Karla D. Miller, A People
Without Law, 5 INDIGENOUS L.J. 83, 95–101 (2006) (discussing leaders who believed that
without reform, “Indians had no legal rights at all.”); cf. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1362, 1505.
209
FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(1) (stating that clerks may not enter default judgments against
either “a minor [or] an incompetent person.”).
210
Contrary to all other cases (except class actions), judges must approve or disapprove
settlements involving minors and incompetents. See, e.g., C.D. CAL. CIV. R. 17-1.2 (“No
claim in any action involving a minor or incompetent person shall be settled, compromised,
or dismissed without leave of the Court embodied in an order, judgment, or decree.”).
211
See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 23 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010)
(“For strict liability to attach, it is not required that the animal be ‘vicious’ or aggressive; a
finding of the animal’s abnormal ‘dangerousness’ is sufficient.”).
212
But see generally Kate Darling, Extending Legal Rights to Social Robots, in ROBOT
LAW (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2015) (proposing limited substantive rights for robots based on
the analogy of animal abuse protections).
213
The primary behavior effect of such a rule would be that owners would, all else
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robots. Relying on an existing model as guidance for the shape of robot litigation
would make us choose between ease of litigation versus ease of recovery. Given the
potential for a new economic bounty for owners of robots and the potential for
numerous injuries caused by robots, this is an undesirable Faustian bargain.
Luckily, there is no conceptual or normative necessity for striking such a
bargain (on whichever side of the spectrum).214 Choosing a model for robot litigation
affords us the chance, if taken early and decisively, to transcend past limitations and
fashion a fresh litigation model that provides injured parties with access to courts
and access to recovery.
The argument against such a proposal is that it would be unfair to robot owners
to create special robot litigation rules that deviate from the usual litigation fabric.
Potentially, such litigation rules could also stifle economic activity (discouraging
the deployment of robots) and innovation (discouraging R&D into robot
technology).
These arguments are important but not decisive. While litigation rules generally
apply to all litigants and all types of suits, there are many, many exceptions to the
trans-substantive and trans-personal norms. As such, while these norms are
important, we have recognized time and again that these norms can and should be
violated when warranted by specific litigation needs and vulnerabilities.
Robot litigation presents such an instance. As noted, the owners of robots in the
future will likely possess far greater economic means than a typical member of the
broad public. As such, owners of robots will possess far greater means to defend
lawsuits away from home than plaintiffs injured by robots. Denying such plaintiffs
access to recovery could lead to hostility towards robots that, in the long run, could
result in public opinion and legislation far more harmful to robot owners and the
economy as a whole. The remainder of this Article will examine what robot litigation
beyond the Faustian bargain entails.
IV. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION, TIMING, PROBLEMS, AND GRAY SPACES
The previous Part explored whether existing models for nontypical human
litigation could be applied to robots. The central argument was that none of these
models are a good fit. All failed minimal ontological, deontological, or functional
thresholds. None seem like a good choice. But choose we must (if only to choose to
remain with the current default). To move forward and to solve the Faustian bargain
between access to enforcement and access to remedies, this Part argues that we must
treat robots as a new litigation category that borrows insights selectively and
partially from the range of existing models. For example, we must craft a new in
being equal, build cheaper robots who control little or no assets (because confiscation of the
robot and the robot’s assets to satisfy a judgment would hurt the owner less). A nonsubsidiary treatment in contrast might lead to the development of robots that are more
expensive and that control more assets.
214
I leave aside here the question whether this kind of bargain is desirable for other
models of litigation.

1064

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

robotam personal jurisdiction doctrine to supplement the old in personam
jurisdiction doctrine.215 We must develop separate standards for how a robot can
establish a domicile for choice-of-law purposes, how liability is shared between
robot and owner, and the many other procedural rules that hinge on an understanding
of intent, personhood, and independent agency. Only by unshackling robots from
existing litigation frameworks can we escape the old Faustian bargain.
This proposed solution is not without problems and ambiguities (as later
sections discuss). Still, it provides a viable, flexible, and pragmatic framework to
account for changing technological capabilities and emerging social norms about
how to integrate robots into everyday interactions.
A. Solution: Split the bundle
The previous sections all implied that procedural treatment can and sometimes
should be separate from substantive treatment. For example, churches and federal
agencies might be treated differently for First Amendment purposes, but both litigate
under the same pleading rules.216 Meanwhile, they might be treated the same under
substantive contract law but different for service of process purposes.217
In short, we recognize in many areas the value of de-coupling substance from
procedure. As such, different procedural treatment for robots in the litigation context
does not necessitate changing how we tax and (substantively) regulate robots.
Contract law may develop separate rules for robot contracting—or not. Tort might
establish unique standards for robot negligence and intent—or not. Similarly,
contract rules might borrow from the insights of robot torts or reject them. The
procedural proposal here has little to say about how substantive legal rules should
treat robots. The argument simply recognizes that robots present unique litigation
problems that are best resolved by creating a unique bundle of solutions.218
These unique solutions cannot be based entirely on one of the existing litigation
models. Instead, we must develop a new synthesis based on the strengths and
weaknesses of existing models. Such a synthesis must account for the special, inbetween ontological status of robots as well as innumerable practical and political
value judgments (briefly, to encourage innovation in robot technology but also
215
Other scholars have made similar arguments that particular classes of litigants call
for different personal jurisdiction analyses. See, e.g., William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson,
Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1205, 1205 (offering a “theory of
personal jurisdiction over aliens” under which “alienage status broadens the geographic
range for minimum contacts from a single state to the whole nation.”).
216
See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (setting forth the pleading requirements for all
claims for relief in federal court).
217
Compare FED. R. CIV. P 4(h) (outlining the rule for serving corporations) with id.
4(i) (outlining the rule for serving the United States and related entities).
218
See Margot E. Kaminski, Authorship, Disrupted: AI Authors in Copyright and First
Amendment Law, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 589, 591 (noting that “[t]he algorithmic ‘author,’
it turns out, gets framed differently by [copyright and First Amendment law], with differently
disruptive results.”).
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protect those injured by robots). This necessitates a rethinking of different areas of
procedure and tailoring each to the challenges robots pose.
Civil procedure did this before with the advent of corporations. Courts could
have treated corporations like individuals, government entities, or some other
established model.219 For a while, courts attempted to fit corporations into one of the
existing folds. But in time the shortcomings of such an accommodationist approach
became apparent. Corporations simply are not like individuals or government
entities (an ontological argument). They are not due the same respect (a
deontological perspective). And treating them like individuals or government
entities undermines important litigation values (a functional point).
As a result, courts and legislators went to work, over many decades, and crafted
litigation rules for corporations that were attentive to the unique nature and
functioning of corporations in the U.S. economy and society. For example, Congress
amended the diversity jurisdiction statute repeatedly to redefine citizenship for
corporations.220 Currently, corporations, unlike humans, can have citizenship in two
states.221 This is a strange result, until one recognizes that it is simply the political
compromise to ongoing debates about corporations’ access to federal courts.222 The
Supreme Court, similarly, continues to weigh in on how to integrate corporations
into the usual litigation fabric and how to set them apart.223 Likewise, numerous
procedural rules and statutes are uniquely addressed to corporations.224
In doing so, legislators and courts created numerous special litigation rules for
corporations but also left many litigation rules untouched. The challenges of
corporate litigation necessitated a doctrine-by-doctrine, rule-by-rule, statute-bystatute approach. Each had to be evaluated and either modified or retained. This is
an ongoing project.

219

Mark, supra note 116, at 1445 (“Several conceptions of the corporation were
available to theorists and policy makers. Corporations could have been seen as analogous to
either individuals or governments. Alternatively, these analogies could have been rejected
and theorists and policymakers could have developed an entirely new body of law to
supersede contemporary doctrine.”).
220
See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–1958 (1992) (examining the
patterns of disputes between individuals and national corporations surrounding federal
diversity jurisdiction between the 1870s and the 1940s).
221
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
222
Or, as it is more commonly put: access to federal courts for plaintiffs who sue
corporations. See PURCELL supra note 220, at 4. (“[N]ational corporations favor[] the federal
courts”)
223
See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–97 (2010).
224
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 7.1(a) (“A nongovernmental corporate party must . . . . ”);
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a) (“This rule applies when one or more shareholders or members of a
corporation or an unincorporated association bring a derivative action to enforce a right that
the corporation or association may properly assert but has failed to enforce.”).
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Similarly, courts and legislators must soon reevaluate innumerable litigation
rules with an eye toward creating exceptions for robot litigation. Of course, such an
approach is super cumbersome and will likely create new doctrinal complexity and
confusion. The alternative, however, is to jam an increasingly square peg into a
round hole.
B. Timing Questions
There remains the question of timing. When should we launch such a project?
Somebody might believe that robots, in some distant future, could raise new
procedural problems but doubt that the time has already come to tackle this question.
Perhaps the question of timing is best left to substantive law considerations. Until
the day when robots are deemed by legislators to hold property, one could argue, it
makes little practical sense anyway to think of robots as separate from their owners
for litigation purposes because, at the end of the day, there is no recovery to be had
from them directly anyway.
This argument, while intuitive in some ways, fails for an abstract and a concrete
reason. On the abstract side, the argument above implicitly assumes the primacy of
substantive over procedural concerns.225 It holds that substance must first recognize
robot personhood before procedure can follow the lead and recognize robot litigation
rules. However, there is no necessity for such a blunt assertion of primacy. Procedure
is concerned with enforcement of substantive rules, whatever they might be.
Plaintiffs injured by robots must be able to enforce, say tort rules against them as
much as plaintiffs who were injured by corporations. If robots raise new
jurisdictional challenges, then procedure can resolve these challenges without
having to wait for substantive tort law to change (similarly, tort law must not await
procedural changes to create, say, a new robot battery rule).226
Beyond this abstract argument about the relationship between substantive law
and procedure, there is also a practical reason to reject a holding-pattern approach
in procedure until robots can hold property in their own name. Recovery from robots
is available even before they can have their own Swiss bank accounts.227 There is
nothing that prevents garnishment of wages or income from robot activities. For
example, imagine a robo-truck that makes deliveries in a state where it causes harm.
The plaintiff could ask for a percentage of the future income the robot generates
from future deliveries until the judgment is satisfied. Similarly, a successful plaintiff
who wins a judgment against a robot could seize the robot itself. Alas, that might be

225

I leave aside here the massive and persistent problems of drawing the line between

the two.
226

For example, on the federal level, the Rules Enabling Act allows federal courts to
promulgate rules that structure the enforcement of existing substantive law as long as they
do “not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
227
I leave aside here the issue of injunctions.
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the only valuable asset that the robot owner has in that jurisdiction anyway. As a
matter of timing, there is nothing that prevents procedure from engaging with these
questions before substantive law adjusts to robot liability itself.
Also, the rise of cryptocurrency disrupts traditional thinking about rules
surrounding the control of assets. Cryptocurrencies have no built-in conditions
concerning who can control, use, spend, and accumulate them. As such, a robot truck
could accumulate bitcoins (say through completing deliveries) and spend bitcoins
(say on fuel and repairs) without having to wait for the law to allow it to hold
property in its own name.
More fundamentally still, law (whether substantive or procedural in nature)
should not wait for technology to create facts and then simply react to new facts.228
Law unavoidably is intertwined with shaping new technologies because innovators,
entrepreneurs, and society create and use new technology with legal entitlements
and liabilities in mind.229 Questions of timing might thus be misplaced in the sense
that the legal construction of the meaning of robots is already ongoing,230 whether
procedure innovates or chooses to hold on to the current treatment of robots as
property.
C. Problems and Gray spaces
Beyond timing questions there are numerous problems with the proposed
solution of creating a new category of robot litigation rules. Relatedly, there are
numerous gray spaces and ambiguities that will complicate any attempts to treat
robots for litigation purposes as anything other than property (no matter how
problematic that categorizations is in its own right).
First, robots as defined and discussed here are physical objects.231 However,
one might question this emphasis on material embodiments of complex algorithms.
Notice, for example, that the term “robots” is frequently applied to essentially nonphysical programs that never interact with humans in the material world.232 Clearly,
228

See Meg Leta Jones, Does Technology Drive Law? The Dilemma of Technological
Exceptionalism in Cyberlaw 6 (June 8, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=29818 [https://perma.cc/KQF2-FDY4]
(“[U]ntil recently the debate around technological exceptionalism has been not whether it
exists, but when it exists. When is a technology so new and so different that it will drive
significant legal change? When is a technology so novel that the law, as established, breaks
and cannot account for it?”).
229
See Kaminski, supra note 218, at 590 (“The law can itself drive technological
development; technologists often design around legal entitlements.”).
230
See, e.g., Chris Arnold, Tax Bill Favors Adding Robots over Workers, Critics Say,
NAT’L. PUB. RADIO (Dec. 8, 2017, 5:01 PM) https://www.npr.org/2017/12/08/569118310/
tax-bill-favors-adding-robots-over-workers-critics-say
[https://perma.cc/XYW6-DQPU]
(noting that some argue that recent tax reforms “expand incentives for companies to buy
robots and machines that replace workers.”).
231
See supra Section I.A.
232
See, e.g., Elaine Glusac, Meet Your New Data-Driven Travel Agent, N.Y. TIMES
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a sophisticated program that we encounter over the internet might display autonomy
similar to the autonomy displayed by a self-driving car. For example, a virtual
assistant without a clear physical embodiment might learn your travel routines and
anticipate your needs and desires and, on its own, make suitable reservations at your
new favorite shawarma restaurant in a town you have never visited before.
Still, it is important and reasonable to emphasize the physical nature of a robot
(as opposed to a detached algorithm). Robots embodied in physical shells force
themselves upon us in ways that naked algorithms do not. Walking down the road
from my home I might encounter an autonomously driving car whether I want to or
not. In contrast, I typically must take an affirmative step to come into contact with
an algorithm in the cloud. For example, I must have decided to engage the
aforementioned travel agent.233 That choice opens the normative and legal
foundation for a contractual relationship that entails, among many other things, the
possibility of a forum-selection clause.234 Since there never was a contract with the
unwillingly encountered autonomous car and no possibility to negotiate a forumselection clause, my ability to recover for damages depends on jurisdictional
doctrines that are fundamentally premised on physical contacts. Insisting on a
material embodiment for a robot thus has important jurisdictional consequences.235
Robots are not just code. They are code embodied in a shell that can be encountered
out there in the world.236 That makes them different from nonphysical algorithms.
(July 10, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/10/travel/meet-your-next-travel-agentdiy-artificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/E9VL-6J9F] (“New-wave [travel] agents
[might be] human, robotic or a combination . . . . ”).
233
But cf. Yaniv Leviathan & Yossi Matias, Google Duplex: An AI System for
Accomplishing Real-World Tasks over the Phone, GOOGLE AI BLOG (May 8, 2018),
https://ai.googleblog.com/2018/05/duplex-ai-system-for-natural-conversation.html
[https://perma.cc/CL6L-AVWU].
234
Form-selection clauses can be one-sided, of course, and used abusively. But those
are problems with forum-selection clause doctrine, not robots or algorithms. See, e.g.,
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590–91 (1991); Atlantic Marine Const.
Co., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 59–60 (2013);
See generally Roger Michalski, Transferred Justice: An Empirical Account of Federal
Transfers in the Wake of Atlantic Marine, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1289 (2016).
235
Despite the misleading language, algorithms “in the cloud” still have a concrete
physical manifestation. After all, the algorithm must run on some hardware that must be
hosed and located somewhere. However, users typically do not know and do not care where
an algorithm that they are using is “located.” Even if they did, it might change instantly or
could be the product of sub-algorithms working together that are located in different location.
Given these additional complexities, I will leave the issue of algorithm jurisdiction aside
here. See Kristen Eichensehr, Data Extraterritoriality, 95 TEX. L. REV. 145, 145 (2017)
(“Data’s intangibility poses significant difficulties for determining where data is located. The
problem is not that data is located nowhere, but that it may be located anywhere, and at least
parts of it may be located nearly everywhere. And access to data does not depend on physical
proximity.” (citations omitted)).
236
As embodied code it also is easier to count instances. Each physical robot is its own
jurisdictional entity. With algorithms, counting entities can be more difficult. Is Siri one thing
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The second objection is similarly definitional. Just how autonomous does a
robot have to be?237 After all, robots predictably will fall on a broad spectrum of
autonomy. On one side of the spectrum might be robots that act autonomously only
rarely, in narrowly defined circumstances, and only for a short time. For example,
some flying drones might contain fail-safe tools that allow them to autonomously
return to the place from where they were launched should their radio-link to a human
controller fail or be interrupted. On the other side of the spectrum we might imagine
autonomous trucks that operate for years with little or no human input, ferrying
cargo back and forth between warehouses based on delivery orders that no human
ever approved or reviewed. Where, on this spectrum, should procedure draw the
line? This is a difficult question that undoubtedly will be impacted by advances in
technology and our social understanding of robots.238 As an initial matter, I
suggested above (built into the definition of robots used in this Article) a humancentric definition: robots that display near, at, or beyond human autonomy should
be treated differently than devices that show only minimal autonomy. I suspect that
fairly soon there will be robots for which this question of how much autonomy is
enough will be easy to answer. And undoubtedly there will always be robots that fall
into a narrow band of space somewhere in the middle between no autonomy and full
autonomy where reasonable people could disagree. Still, the presence of some
entities in this middle gray space does not undermine the important conceptual and
normative work accomplished by drawing a reasonable line between autonomous
robots and non-autonomous devices.239
(in the cloud, accessed by many) or is it many things (one instance in each iPhone)? That
being said, counting robots could also prove difficult in the future because significant
research emphasizes the value of swarm robotics where many physical components come
together (for long or short period of times) in constantly changing constellations to
accomplish tasks. See e.g., KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 45 (discussing the potential military
application of “swarm robotics”).
237
This question quickly leads to a philosophical morass about the nature of thought,
the self, self-awareness, independent reasoning, creativity, adaptability, consciousness, and
the essence of humanity itself. See generally A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and
Intelligence, 59 MIND 433, 442 (1950) (arguing that instead of discussing essential traits, our
focus should be on external manifestations of thought processes as illustrated by an
“imitation game” where a human has to guess whether she is interacting with another human
or a machine).
238
It is complicated further by the strong likelihood that many robots will work in
collaboration with humans yet still make their own decisions. Separating human decisionmaking from robot decision-making in such circumstances promises to be a massive
headache. However, it is unavoidable. If we do not decide such question at the jurisdictional
stage, we just delay the decision to the liability stage.
239
Similarly, substantive law will have to confront and answer this definitional
question. See, e.g., Scherer, supra note 64, at 395 (calling for a government agency that can
will establish an AI safety certification process); Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69
ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 83 (2017) (“This Article proposes that certain classes of new algorithms
should not be permitted to be distributed or sold without approval from a government agency
designed along the lines of the FDA.”).
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D. In the Crystal Ball
So far, we mostly focused on robot defendants. But can they sue as well as
plaintiffs? As part of a class? As an entire class without non-robot litigants? These
are seemingly small issues, but they point to a larger concern: creep.
There is a danger in treating autonomous robots as something other than
property for litigation purposes that is highly speculative and highly problematic.
Separating robots from their owners for procedural purposes can lay the groundwork
for separating them from owners for other purposes as well. A procedural status as
something other than property can be the beginning for a substantive status as
something other than property.240 Perhaps a kind of artificial person entitled to basic
and constitutional rights. Slowly, unintentionally, clandestinely, robots could build
on procedural foundations to become substantive rights bearers.241
This is not mere fantasy. Something like it has happened once before.
Corporations acquired a unique status in procedural affairs long before they started
to amass substantive rights, cumulating, for now, in claims to constitutional
protections previously only afforded to humans.242
This possibility of procedural changes laying the foundation for substantive
rights gives great urgency to procedural discussions about the status of robots in our
legal system.243 Much of this is speculative. However, given our path-dependent
legal system, small decisions now can have significant and unintended ramifications
down the road.
240

See, e.g., Open Letter to the European Commission Artificial Intelligence and
Robotics, ROBOTICS-OPENLETTER.EU, http://www.robotics-openletter.eu/ [https://perma.cc/
R6ZL-XR4C] (“A legal status for a robot can’t derive from the Natural Person model, since
the robot would then hold human rights, such as the right to dignity, the right to its integrity,
the right to remuneration or the right to citizenship, thus directly confronting the Human
rights. This would be in contradiction with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.”); See also Ivana Kottasová, Experts Warn Europe: Don’t Grant Robots Rights,
CNN TECH, (Apr. 12, 2018), http://money.cnn.com/2018/04/12/technology/robots-rightsexperts-warn-europe/index.html [https://perma.cc/PB69-UVXF].
241
See Calo, Lessons of Cyberlaw, supra note 22, at 515 (“[R]obots, more so than any
technology in history, feel to us like social actors—a tendency so strong that soldiers
sometimes jeopardize themselves to preserve the ‘lives’ of military robots in the field.”).
242
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (“The
Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other
associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such
associations are not ‘natural persons.’”).
243
See KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 199–200 (“There’s nothing to stop a synthetic intellect,
whether enshrined in law as an artificial person or crudely wrapped in a corporate shell, from
outcompeting us at our own game. Such entities could amass vast fortunes, dominate
markets, buy up land, own natural resources, and ultimately employ legions of humans as
their nominees, fiduciaries, and agents—and that’s in the happy event that they deign to use
as at all. The slave becomes the master.”).
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CONCLUSION
The rise of robotics out there in the shared world has massive implications for
how we tax, how we regulate, how we think about responsibilities, intent, and rights.
All of these substantive questions will pass, sooner or later, through litigation
because laws and regulations do not enforce themselves. Substantive law is already
adjusting to autonomous robots, but procedure has not similarly engaged with the
thorny questions raised by robots.
Doing so will require a tremendous amount of guesswork, continuous
adjusting, and admitting folly.244 It will also require rethinking many areas of
procedural law to meet the unique challenges robot litigation presents. As such, this
Article is not a final answer to the questions of robot litigation, but a call to scholars
to address doctrine-by-doctrine, statute-by-statute, and rule-by-rule the places where
our unitary litigation framework will hold and identify the places where it will need
to be adjusted. This work is practical, political, philosophical, and ultimately as
unavoidable as an autonomous car hurtling straight at you on the highway.

244

See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 14, at 383 (“Predicting the future is a surefire way
to embarrass oneself.”).

